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SUMMARY
This thesis examines the strategic drivers and processes governing the development
of products and/or technologies by multiple economic entities. The thesis adopts an op-
erational approach in addressing the question and examines the “how” of joint product
development. For this purpose, the different mechanisms that enable joint product devel-
opment - licensing, outsourced development, and codevelopment - are considered, and the
focus is restricted to the analysis and characterization of the optimal management of joint
product development mechanisms.
Regarding the mechanism of licensing, the thesis examines both its dynamic inter-
temporal implications (i.e., how licenses should be structured given that licensing will also
occur in the future) as well as the role of the technology in question (i.e., how are licenses
affected by the type of technology being licensed). Along the first dimension, the thesis
finds that license fees (and the negotiation with potential licensees) may be structured so
as to induce a “controlled diffusion” depending on the technology roadmap the provider
firm has laid out for the future. On the second dimension, the study finds that when the
technological solution being licensed requires minimal integration from the licensees side,
it may be beneficial to restrict attention to a few potential licensees instead of licensing to
the entire market.
On the codevelopment side, the thesis presents an original case study that uncovers
some of the salient features present in many joint development efforts. Subsequently, a
mathematical model is proposed that captures the key dimensions of the phenomenon that
were identified through the case study. Analysis of the normative model reveals the key role
of market and development uncertainty in structuring the formal contractual agreements




In several industries, product development requires collaboration with outside firms on a
scale that was unimaginable until recently. The reasons for such large-scale collaboration
and coordination are be numerous and may include demand-side drivers such as increased
importance of fast product development and/or supply-side drivers such as greater degree of
specialized capabilities; but trend towards collaboration seems unmistakable. The current
study is motivated by this trend and examines the question “how should/do firms manage
joint product development efforts?” Thus, the focus of this study lies in examining the
operational aspect of effective management of joint product development efforts.
NSF, in a whitepaper entitled Science and Engineering Indicators (2004), states that
non-equity-based, short-lived, alliances aimed towards product development is becoming
increasingly common in industries such as biotechology and information technology. Also,
they find that while the inhouse funding for R&D has increased at a rate of 3.8% over
the past 8 years, the funding for outsourced R&D has increased at a rate of 4.8% over the
same period. Furthermore, firms such as Qualcomm (a leading provider of cellphone-related
Intellectual Property), Texas Instruments (a leading provider of Digital Signal Processor
solutions), and DuPont (a leading provider of chemical process licenses) earn a significant
portion of their revenues from licensing core components and/or processes to outside ven-
dors.
These trends seem to indicate that a significant fraction of product development efforts
that used to occur within a single firm may be being replaced by product development
processes that spans across firms. Three distinct industrial settings are given below to
illustrate the broad scope of the phenomenon and to set the stage for the dissertation.
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R1: In the market for desktop PC, a highly disintegrated industry, manufacturers (original
equipment manufacturers) such as Dell routinely procure the core component, the
microprocessor, from the component technology provider, Intel. Furthermore, Intel
also licenses (sells) its components to multiple OEMs. This example illustrates a
setting where the division of the product development responsibilities is unambiguous
and where there is a “technology market,” with its associated market mechanisms
such as pricing etc., to facilitate the transfer of technology between economic entities.
R2: IDEO, a firm which specializes in product/service design has recently emerged as a
strong player in the customized-design business boasting a clientele which includes
many Fortune 500 firms. In such a setting of outsourced development, the division of
product development responsibilities is unambiguous. However, there is no “technol-
ogy market,” and therefore, the price of each unique project is individually negotiated.
Furthermore, the design developed for one client firm cannot usually be licensed to
others.
R3: Recently, Delta Airlines collaborated with 3M to develop a flame-resistant paper that
could potentially be licensed to airline carriers Kavadias and Erat (2005). This co-
development project required the two firms to interact on a frequent basis so as to
jointly develop a new product. The example illustrates an industrial setting where,
before the project started, the division of product development effort was unknown.
Furthermore, the expertise that each firm provided was unique and could not be
acquired easily from any outside “technology market.”
These illustrative examples allow us to conceptualize the following broad types of in-
dustrial settings relevant to joint product development. The setting illustrated by R1,
Dell-Intel, offers an example where the dependencies between development tasks is min-
imal (possibly due to well defined interfaces). Thus, it is possible to imagine a product
development process composed of two relatively independent parts - Intel’s part consisting
of developing the microprocessor, and Dell’s part consisting of integrating the components
into a fully functional end-product. Furthermore, in this setting the capabilities required
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for development are relatively widely available and not unique to a single firm (for instance
a number of vendors other than Dell have similar or identical product development capa-
bilities as Dell). Similarly, the setting illustrated by R2 and R3 fall into the top-right and
bottom-right quadrant of the figure given below.
Specificity of Capabilities
Low High
Interconnectness of Development Tasks
Low Dell-Intel IDEO-Bank of America
High - Delta-3M
Based on this typology of industrial contexts relevant to joint product development and
the industrial examples given in R1-3, it can be observed that the mechanisms used to
undertake joint product development may depend on the industrial context. For instance,
with low interconnectness of development tasks and low specificity of capabilities, it be-
comes possible to have a hands-off collaboration that is facilitated through market-mediated
mechanisms such as licensing. However, with low interconnectness of development tasks and
high specificity of capabilities, even if a hands-off approach is adopted intense negotiations
might be required to agree to licensing terms (since the capabilities and hence the prod-
uct/technology that is being transferred is somewhat unique). This might lead to using an
outsourced product development mechanism to operationalize joint product development in
contexts of low interconnectness and high asset specificity. Lastly, with high interconnect-
ness of development tasks and high specificity of capabilities it might not be possible, even
with any amount of negotiation, to agree to contract terms before developing the product
jointly. This might make the mechanism of codevelopment more suited for such contexts.
This dissertation takes an operational approach to understanding the strategic drivers
and the processes governing the development of products and/or technologies by multiple
economic entities. Thus, this dissertation attempts to answer the “how” of joint product
development by focusing on how firms manage mechanisms such as licensing (illustrated
in R1), outsourced product development (as in R2), and/or codevelopment (illustrated
in R3) that enable joint product development. For this purpose, the rest of the thesis is
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organized based on the type of mechanism and industry context it addresses.
The first two chapters of this thesis, §2 and §3, examine the setting illustrated by R1.
In §2 the thesis examines the main drivers of a technology provider’s (technology) develop-
ment and introduction decision when she may license a stream of improving technologies
to multiple competing OEMs. One of the main results found in such technology licensing
context relates to the optimality of “controlled diffusion,” i.e., inducing only a few OEMs
to adopt a given technology in any period, if the future technology increments are not sub-
stantial. In addition, the study also finds that when future technology improvements are
not expected to be large, the OEMs may demonstrate a technology leap-frogging behavior
where they skip one technology only to adopt the next improvement.
The second chapter, §3, focuses exclusively on providers of component technologies,
and examines the impact of operational variables related to the technology, such as the
architecture and the level of technology improvement, on a technology provider’s optimal
licensing policy. The study illustrates that accounting for these operational variables may
in general make a fixed-price plus volume-based royalties licensing scheme optimal. This
important result conforms to empirical observations from past studies and stands in stark
contrast to much of the theoretical results from licensing literature that predict the sub-
optimality of volume-based royalties.
The third chapter, §4, analyzes the setting illustrated by R3 and formulates a normative
model based on a case-study of the Delta-3M co-development project Kavadias and Erat
(2005). The study explicitly accounts for NPD variables such as internal (development)
and external (market) uncertainty and finds that it may be optimal to delay signing the
revenue/cost sharing contract after the joint development effort has commenced depending
on the level of internal and external uncertainty.
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CHAPTER II
TECHNOLOGY INTRODUCTION AND CONTROLLED
DIFFUSION: CASE OF INTER-TEMPORAL LICENSING
It is often the case in business-to-business (B2B) markets that technology providers intro-
duce and sell new process and component technologies to firms that compete for the same
downstream end-product market. These technology providers, on the other hand, usually
operate in monopoly or near-monopoly positions.
The following motivating examples from two industries sets the stage for the study:
In chemicals, DuPont recently has developed a new biotechnology-based process, namely
Sorona GT, which produces a nylon-like polymer out of corn starch using a genetically engi-
neered version of a common bacterium (Miller, 2002). This new process exhibits significant
advantages to the adopters in terms of both cost effectiveness and end-product properties
of the manufactured polymer. Consequently, DuPont has announced the sale of its textiles
division (including nylon) and has established a new division to exploit the benefits from
“selling” the Sorona GT process and their future innovations (Forbes 2/3/2003, Wall Street
Journal 11/18/2003).
In electronics, a relatively medium-sized firm, namely ARM (Advanced RISC Machines),
is the market leader in developing and selling architectures for cell-phone handset manu-
facturers. Although ARM is a near monopolist with upward of 80% market share, its
customers - Nokia, Motorola, Siemens, and Samsung - have significantly less market power
and compete intensely in various segments of the cell-phone handset market.
These examples describe a business context that is the focus of this chapter. Near-
monopolistic technology providers develop new process technologies or architecture/component
technologies based on patented intellectual property (IP) and introduce these technologies
to markets of competing industrial customers (hereafter referred to as OEMs or simply as
customers).
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The process or component technologies utilized by an OEM influence the performance
of the end-product he manufactures (e.g., nylon, textiles, cell phones). The performance
of these end-products, in most contexts, determines the end-customer choice and thus af-
fects an OEM’s market share and revenue. Hence, the performance quality of end-products
(which is determined by the technologies utilized) forms the basis of competition among the
OEMs. Quoting a Motorola manager (an ARM customer) “. . . [ARM’s architectural solu-
tion] benefits the licensees in providing time to market, design, and customization features”
(RCR Wireless News 3/10/2003). Furthermore, past research has found empirical support
for the impact of core components and technologies on product competitiveness (Schilling,
2000) and on the evolution of industries (Tushman and Murmann, 1998; Baldwin and Clark,
1999).
Within this context of strategic technology introduction and competitive adoption, we
develop an analytical model that explores the determinants of the technology provider’s
introduction decisions. First, we derive and analyze the optimal technology development
and pricing decisions of a monopolistic technology provider who introduces new technologies
to a market of OEMs with similar integration capabilities. We discuss two distinct scenarios:
(a) technology providers who have committed to a technology road-map and decide on
pricing in every introduction, and (b) technology providers who employ both levers - pricing
and development - and may decide on both. Next, we extend the base-case model to more
general technology markets by explicitly considering the nature of the technology and the
constraints it imposes (e.g., significant installation/integration costs, potential for upgrade
prices, or volume-based pricing in the context of new component technologies) and the OEM
market-related attributes (such as the capability differences among OEMs). We employ a
two-period game theoretic framework to capture the dynamics of technology introduction
strategies.
Our results indicate that the technology provider (provider, hereafter) may find it op-
timal to induce partial adoption of the new technology through the appropriate pricing
decisions. This result is robust across different scenarios, even in the case where all OEMs
initially employ the same technology. Under this “partial adoption” strategy, the provider
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induces the non-adopters of currently offered technology to adopt future technological of-
ferings. Since, a part of the OEM market (is induced to) pass over one technology to
adopt the future technology, we term it the “leapfrogging” strategy. The optimality of this
strategy depends on the magnitude of the technological progress or, equivalently, on the
development cost structure. We establish a technology progress (development cost) thresh-
old, above (below) which the leapfrogging strategy is no longer optimal, and the provider
optimally induces all the OEMs to adopt (“saturation” strategy).
We also explore the effect of some key parameters on the optimal policy. We find that
even for negligible development costs, offering a superior technology may lead to lower
revenues for the provider. Lower probability of delayed technology introduction results in
the technology provider undertaking lower development effort. Finally, provider revenues
(and profits) are shown to be convex and decreasing in the probability of delayed launch,
offering additional theoretical support for the importance of reliability and time-to-market
in technology development (Hendricks and Singhal, 1997).
Our extensions, in addition to illustrating the robustness of the base-case results, also al-
low us to develop insights regarding the technology introduction decisions when the OEMs
have heterogeneous technology exploitation capabilities. We categorize these capabilities
based on the mechanism by which they enhance the OEM’s end-product quality, enabling
us to identify that the technology provider should optimally focus on (i) OEMs who have
superior (greater) capabilities, if these capabilities enhance the value of the employed tech-
nology (e.g., new product development capabilities) and (ii) on OEMs who have inferior
(lower) capabilities, if these capabilities provide value independently of the technology (e.g.,
supply chain efficiency or logistics capabilities).
The findings in this chapter makes several contributions: On the theoretical side, we offer
a comprehensive game theoretic framework that accounts for the interactions between the
technology introduction decisions and the technology adoption decision. Previous normative
academic literature has focused on only one of those two aspects. Several examples from
B2B markets, however, indicate a strong linkage between the two, suggesting the need
for a more holistic approach. On the applied side, we discuss how our findings can be
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translated into managerial guidelines. As with most abstract mathematical models of high-
level strategic phenomena, our model is not meant to be applied as a decision-support tool,
as any real situation contains numerous confounding factors. Still, the sensitivity results
may be cautiously used to build intuition regarding the directional impact of interactions
between relevant measurable variables, such as the performance improvement offered by
future innovation, the development uncertainty, and the market growth.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In §2.1 we give a brief review of the
operations management, marketing, and economics literature relating to technology adop-
tion and new product introduction. The model is introduced in §2.2. The analysis of the
base-case is presented in §2.3. §2.4 presents various extensions to base-case model. Finally,
§2.5 concludes with the managerial implications, limitations of the model, and some future
research directions.
2.1 Literature Review
There are three areas in the academic literature that have explored different issues related
to our research question: first, the technology adoption literature, which has analyzed the
strategic adoption decision of firms assuming that both technology and prices are exogenous
variables; second, the new product introduction literature, which has examined questions
relating to the timing and/or the order of introduction of durable new products; third,
the inter-temporal price discrimination literature, which has studied how firms selling to
heterogeneous markets modify prices over time so as to extract maximum revenues.
Technology Adoption:
Competition among firms and its effect on adoption times have been studied in a wide
variety of contexts. Balcer and Lippman (1984) study the effect of performance expectations
of future technologies on the adoption time and prove the existence of an optimal threshold
level for the difference between best technology in the market and the firm’s current tech-
nology, below which adoption does not occur. Also, they claim that this optimal threshold
increases when the discovery potential is higher (i.e., technology improves more rapidly).
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Subsequently, Kornish (1999) showed that this sensitivity result is incorrect. Reinganum
(1981b,a) examines a continuous time formulation of competitive technology adoption and
concludes that there exists a “diffusion equilibrium” even if the adopting firms are ex-ante
identical. This “diffusion” effect occurs because once a firm commits credibly to adoption
at a certain time, its competitor would find it beneficial to adopt later, after the cost of
technology has sufficiently decreased. The validity of this result is disputed by Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1985), who demonstrate that the “diffusion” equilibrium in Reinganum’s
continuous-time game is not subgame perfect and hence not credible.
Jensen (1982) considers the competitive adoption of an exogenously arriving technology
and identifies the technology uncertainty (both in timing as well as in magnitude) as an
explanation for the empirically observed diffusion patterns. McCardle (1985) builds on this
work and develops a single firm model of technology adoption where delaying the adop-
tion decision can be accompanied by information collection so as to reduce the associated
uncertainty. Since information acquisition is costly, even in optimal behavior, unprofitable
technologies may be adopted. The model is extended by Mamer and McCardle (1987)
to include competition and market uncertainty regarding competitors’ adoption decisions.
Product substitutability is shown to make adoption less likely. Gaimon (1989) considers
the competitive adoption of exogenously-arriving cost-reducing process technologies along-
side the scrapping of old technologies. She distinguishes between open-loop and closed-loop
strategies and finds that the ability to commit credibly to adoption decisions result in
greater profits and greater extent of technology adoption.
New Product Introduction:
Moorthy and Png (1992) explore the effect of customer expectations and impatience
on the introduction strategies for two durable products. They conclude that sequential
introduction is preferable to simultaneous introduction when cannibalization is significant
and consumers are more impatient than the seller. Cohen et al. (1996) explore the effects
of competition on the launch dates and the performance of new products. A firm facing
more intense competition should aim either for greater product performance or for earlier
product launch.
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Dhebar (1994) considers a monopolist selling a durable product to a heterogeneous
downstream market and analyzes the impact of future improved versions on the price of
current technology. He shows that without credible commitment on the future prices and
the future quality, no equilibrium strategies exist. Kornish (2001) extends his work, assum-
ing that the firm is capable of (credibly) not offering upgrade prices; she shows that this
may result in a credible (sub-game perfect) equilibrium pricing strategy. In this chapter, as
one of the extensions, we consider rational and competing industrial customers and show
that even with upgrade prices, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium pricing strategy.
On the product design & development side, Krishnan and Ramachandran (2004) analyze a
monopolist selling design-intensive products to rational customers. They find that architec-
tural decisions (specifically, decisions to split a product into modules) can reduce costumer
regret and enable the monopolist to maintain a credible price-discrimination strategy.
Inter-temporal Price Discrimination:
Coase (1972) explores the inter-temporal price discrimination behavior of a durable-
goods monopolist and finds that, assuming rational and patient customers and infinitely
durable goods, the price must instantly fall to the marginal cost. Although, the original
Coase model was formulated in continuous time, identical effects (i.e., loss of monopoly
power) have been observed even in the discrete period settings (Bulow, 1982). The validity
of the Coase result and its assumptions (under the name Coase conjecture) has subse-
quently come under close scrutiny (Bagnoli et al., 1989; Guth and Ritzberger, 1998). A set
of sufficient conditions - for example, finite collection of customers, finite capacity supplier,
increasing marginal cost of production - has been identified under which the Coase conjec-
ture fails to hold. For a thorough discussion of price discrimination mechanisms see Varian
(1989).
All the three streams of literature discussed above focus either on new product intro-
duction to non-strategic customers or on technology adoption decisions made by competing
firms under exogenously determined adoption costs. In this chapter, we model and analyze
the effects of downstream competition (among the OEMs) on the technology provider’s new
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technology introduction. We identify the technology demand as endogenous, by establish-
ing the link between the technology adoption decisions and the technology introduction
strategy. Finally, we account for the strategic considerations of the industrial customers
and analyze the resulting (multiple) subgame perfect Nash equilibria to derive the optimal
technology introduction strategy.
2.2 Model Setup
Consider a monopolist technology provider who develops and sequentially introduces new
product/process technologies to a market of n competing OEMs. We focus on a two period
model to capture the dynamic inter-temporal effects, a standard assumption in related
literature (Dhebar, 1994; Kornish, 2001). Period 1 accounts for the current technology
introduction and development of a new technology, whereas period 2 accounts for future
introduction.
The technology provider “prices” a new technology1 T at W1 and introduces it into
a market of competing OEMs in period 1. The “price” vector W1 represents a schedule
of payments for each adopting OEM, i.e., how much to pay in first period, how much in
second period, whether the fees are volume-based, etc.
In period 1, along with setting the price W1, the provider also decides to develop a
new technology αT (α ≥ 1) to be introduced in period 2. Technology development requires
time and substantial investment. Hence, the provider needs to initiate development during
the first period, thus sending a credible signal to the market regarding the technology
development decision. In practice, such signals materialize through trade shows and press
releases. The development cost, for an α-enhancement is given by C(α); C(α) is increasing
in α, and C(1) = 0.
Initially (at the beginning of period 1), all the OEMs employ identical technology (i.e.,
standard process or know-how, with performance normalized to 1). This assumption enables
us to isolate the impact of downstream competition on the technology introduction decisions
1T represents the performance of a new process know-how, heavy equipment, architecture, or a combined
system that realizes an improvement in the manufactured end-product.
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without having to contend with the confounding effects of initial asymmetry. Still, our model
allows possible asymmetries in technology usage in the subsequent period.
Each period, the OEMs compete for a common end-product market based on their
end-product quality2. Our motivating examples drive this assumption on the importance of
end-product performance (quality). Let Qki be the quality of the end-product manufactured
by the ith OEM in period k (k = 1, 2), and suppose Qki depends on both (i) the technology
3
T ki employed by OEM i in period k (ii) and his capabilities κi. That is, Q
k
i = F (κi, T
k
i ),
F (κ, T ) increasing in κ and T .
The customers to whom the OEMs sell their end-product are assumed to be quality-
conscious and favor the OEM who provides greater end-product quality. Hence, the OEM
revenues and market share depend on both his end-product quality and the qualities of his
competitors’ end-products. The market share of an OEM is determined through a Market
Share Attraction Model:





and his revenues through the part of the end-product market he has captured:
revenue = (total end-product market size in dollars) × (market share)
Market share attraction models (MSA) are widely used in the marketing literature (Bell
et al., 1975; Monahan, 1987; Gruca and Sudharshan, 1991), and have been shown to have
excellent predictive power (Naert and Weverbergh, 1981).
Given this structure of competition, in each period, all the n OEMs simultaneously4
decide on technology adoption based on their increase in revenues due to adoption. Note
2Although we assume a competition mechanism based on quality, as we show in Erat and Kavadias (2005),
subject to mild regularity conditions, the fundamental insight of our model remains intact for different forms
of competition. Two widely used competition mechanisms that conform to these regularity conditions are
the case where technology reduces manufacturing costs and the OEMs engage in differentiated Bertrand
(price) competition, and the case where they engage in Cournot (quantity) competition.
3Notice that T ki depends on the adoption decision of OEM i in the following way:
T 1i =

T if OEM i adopted in period 1
1 otherwise.
and T 2i =

αT if OEM i adopted in period 2
T 1i otherwise.
4In game theoretic terms, the simultaneous decision assumption is equivalent to assuming lack of commu-
nication among the industrial customers. Although the lack of communication between industrial customers
might be valid in most settings, the applicability of our results extend to even more general situations. We
show in Erat and Kavadias (2005) that the assumption of simultaneous decision making with regard to
the OEMs is not critical for our results and that all our results hold even if we assume that the industrial
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that in the first period each OEM makes the decision accounting for the current (period 1)
and future (period 2) payoffs, and in the second period, the decision rests upon the past
choices and potential revenues from additional adoption. Example 1 given in the Appendix
A illustrates this mechanism of technology adoption with a basic single-period example.
The size of the common end-product market (measured in dollars) for which the OEMs
compete in the first period is normalized to 1, and in the second period is m. Furthermore,
while in many industries the size of the end-product market may be relatively unaffected
by the underlying technology5, it may be the case for some that end-product market size
increases due to the enhancement of the underlying technology. Hence, we assume that
the end-product market size in second period is m = m(α), where m(·) is a non-decreasing
function.
We assume that the OEMs have an identical discount factor for their future profits.
Suppose the technology provider announces that the next version (αT ) is to be introduced
at ta. Due to uncertainty in technology development, however, there is some probability p
that the launch date slips by d. Furthermore, the extent of technology development that
the provider undertakes may affect the probability of launch delay, i.e., p = p(α) where p(·)
is an non-increasing function. OEMs discount second-period payoffs by δ(t) if the actual
time of introduction of future technology is t. The possibility of a delayed launch, however,
renders the discount factor uncertain as well. Let δ = E[δ(t)] = (1 − p)δ(ta) + pδ(ta + d).
Hence, δ is a decreasing linear function of p.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the game. In the first period of the game, the provider
launches technology T and decides on the next technology αT . She prices technology T at
W1, and the OEMs decide on technology adoption.
In the second period the provider introduces the newly developed technology αT and
customers sequentially decide on technology adoption in some arbitrary pre-specified order. For this cor-
responding sequential version of the game, the OEMs’ payoff structure is the same as in the simultaneous
game.
5In our main motivating example of carpet manufacturers who use DuPont’s Sorona GT, it is unlikely
that the total market for carpets is impacted by the process innovation (external events, e.g., how well
the real-estate business is doing, is possibly going to have a greater impact on market-size for carpets).
Additionally in the hi-tech industry of cell phone manufacturers it seems less likely that the total number
of cell phones buyers increase because of ARM’s protocol innovation.
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Figure 1: Timing of the game
prices it at W2. OEMs again decide on adoption of the new technology αT . All the
preceding decisions are assumed to be common knowledge.
2.3 Base-case Model
The general model as presented above encompasses multiple licensing mechanisms (for in-
stance the price vector W1 and W2 may model licensing mechanisms such as volume-based
royalty, one-time fee, per-period license fee, possible upgrade prices, etc.) and varied OEM
market structures (suitable choices of κ and F (·) may be utilized to model the extent and
nature of OEM capabilities and different types of asymmetric OEM market structures). To
gradually build our intuition while maintaining analytical tractability, we start our analysis
by considering a relatively simpler base-case model. Subsequently, §2.4 relaxes the base-case
assumptions one at a time in to obtain additional insights as well as to verify the robustness
of our results.
Table 1: Base-case Assumptions
Nature of Technology OEM Market Structure
[T.1] The technology does not have a
significant impact on the end-
product market-size or the delay
probability
[S.1] The capabilities of all the OEMs
are identical.
[T.2] The technology provider does not
offer any special upgrade price
[T.3] The technology provider uses a
fixed one-time payment scheme
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The base-case assumptions given in Table 1 are grouped into two major categories: those
relating to the nature of the technology and its impact on end-product market, and those
relating to the OEM market structure.
By Assumption T.1, the end-product market-size m and the delay probability p are
exogenously specified constants unaffected by the future technological enhancement α. As-
sumption T.2 implies that the provider does not offer any special upgrade prices. Further-
more, by assumption T.3, the technology provider transfers life-time usage rights of the tech-
nology to the adopting OEM for a single one-time payment. Thus, the price vectors W1 and
W2 have only one component, W1 and W2 respectively, representing the one-time payment.
Finally, by assumption S.1, κi = κ for all i. Thus, the quality Qki = F (κ, T
k
i ) = Fκ(T
k
i ).
We normalize the technology T by defining a normalized technology T ′ = Fκ(T ). Hence,
without loss of generality, in the base-case, we let the quality of the end-product be Q = T .
§2.3.1 and §2.3.2 derive the optimal pricing decisions and the technology development
decision, respectively, in two steps: (a) Theorem 1 gives the optimal pricing decision, given
the technology development decision in stage 1, and (b) a mathematical program is formu-
lated to solve for the optimal technology development and pricing scheme that maximizes
the monopolist’s overall profits. We focus on the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure
strategies for this multi-stage game.
2.3.1 Technology Pricing
In this section, we derive and analyze the optimal pricing in both periods and the associated
adoption equilibria for an arbitrary technology development decision. We provide the main
notations in Table 2 (for an extended list of notations refer to the Appendix A).
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Table 2: Base-case: List of notations
f : fraction of adopters in 1st period









st period price to induce fraction f(< 1) to adopt T






: 2nd period price to induce remaining (1− f)n OEMs to adopt αT
W a1 =
1
n − 1nT−T+1 : 1st period price that induces all the OEMs (f = 1) to adopt T





: 2nd period price that induces all the OEMs (f = 1) to adopt αT
F : Feasible set for f
f∗(α) = arg maxf∈F
{
fW p1 (f, α)
+(1− f)W p2 (f, α)
}





+(1− f∗(α))W p2 (f∗(α), α)
]
: Maximal revenues when f < 1
πa(α) = n(W a1 + W
a
2 (α)) : Maximal revenue when f = 1
Theorem 1 Given an arbitrary first-period technology T and second-period technology αT
• if πa(α) ≤ πp(α), then there exists an f∗(α) (< 1) such that the technology provider
prices the technologies so as to induce nf∗ (α) OEMs to adopt technology T in first pe-







• if πa(α) > πp(α), then the technology provider optimally sells the technologies T and
αT to all the OEMs in both periods.
Theorem 1 derives the optimal pricing policy, given the technology road-map. The tech-
nology provider may have announced a technology road-map some generations ahead for
strategic reasons other than short-term profit maximization7. Still, technology providers
retain considerable flexibility in pricing/licensing. For example, in the microprocessor in-
dustry, ARM has set out a road-map for future generations of its technology TrustZone
(which is scheduled for introduction in 2005). However, the pricing schedule (including
the licensing fees) for the technology has not been announced yet (see ARM website:





equilibria) is a direct result of our assumption of symmetric
OEMs and simultaneous decision-making. Though the non-uniqueness of equilibria may curtail the predictive
power of general game theoretic models (for instance the classic Hawk-Dove game has 2 equilibria), our study
does not suffer very much from this shortcoming as our focus is on the provider’s introduction decisions.
And for this purpose, the issue of which equilibrium would emerge, though theoretically interesting, is less
relevant, since irrespective of the equilibrium chosen, the technology supplier gains the same revenues and
will use the same pricing and introduction strategy. The game where OEMs sequentially make decisions has
a unique equilibrium that is qualitatively identical to the equilibria given in Theorem 1 (Erat and Kavadias,
2005).
7For instance, severe pressure to constantly innovate rapidly so as to maintain a monopoly position.
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www.arm.com/micsPDFS/4136.pdf).
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the technology provider may either (a) induce all the
OEMs to adopt in both the periods, or (b) induce adoption by only a fraction of the OEMs
in first period, and induce the remaining OEMs to skip the first period technology and move
directly to the second period technology. We call the former scenario the saturation strategy
and the latter the leapfrogging strategy. Example 2 given in the Appendix A illustrates this
two-fold structure.
The leapfrogging strategy is a general form of inter-temporal price discrimination, a
mechanism that the technology provider employs for revenue maximization. The possibility
of price discrimination in our model is intuitive despite the assumption of an industrial
market where all OEMs employ the same initial technology. To induce fewer OEMs to
adopt initially, the provider sets a high enough price for the first-period technology, thus
dividing the OEMs into two groups in the post-introduction era: (i) the technologically
advanced (i.e., OEMs who adopted in period 1 and consequently own a technology that is
superior to the current average technology in the market) and the technological laggards
(i.e., OEMs who due to non-adoption in period 1 own a technology that is inferior compared
to the current average technology). In the second period, the laggards’ marginal benefit
from adoption is higher (compared to the technologically advanced), since they currently
have the inferior technology. Hence, the provider again can set a high price and this time
induce only the laggards to adopt. Our result adds to the Industrial Organization theory
of price discrimination by extending it to the case of competing customers.
Proposition 1 reveals how the choice of the revenue maximization strategy depends on
the performance improvement that the second-period technology provides.
Proposition 1 The leapfrogging strategy is optimal if and only if the technology improve-
ment introduced in second period is lower than a threshold αt.
Figure 2 illustrates the technology provider’s total revenue based on the two possible
strategies. The solid line corresponds to the saturation strategy and the dotted line to the














Figure 2: Provider revenues
the end-product performance, then the provider would “milk” the maximum revenue she
can from the current (initial) technology.
The price charged for the current technology (T ) depends on the technology develop-
ment decision (α) only if the technology enhancement is incremental8 (i.e., α < αt). This
observation suggests an important managerial guideline: In industries with high technology
progress (i.e., significant improvements between subsequent versions), the introduction deci-
sion shall be made so as to saturate the market and is independent of the future technology
offerings, whereas in mature markets (i.e., markets where technology improves incremen-
tally), the introduction decision shall create asymmetry in the OEM market depending on
the future technology offerings.
For the special case α = 1, Corollary 1 characterizes the multi-period introduction of a
new technology.
Corollary 1 When a single technology is introduced over two periods, the technology provider
follows the leapfrogging strategy. Furthermore, the optimal price path is decreasing over
time.
Corollary 1 examines an interesting special case: the “diffusion” of a single new technology
into a competitive market under the assumption that prices are constant within a period.
8Observe from Table 2 that under the saturation regime, the initial price W a1 is independent of the



























Figure 3: Optimal first- and second-period prices, and the fraction of adopters
Reinganum (1981b) arrived at a similar notion of “diffusion equilibria” by assuming that
the price path is decreasing over time. Our result demonstrates that a decreasing price
path is indeed optimal for the provider and thus offers an additional explanation for the
empirically observed diffusion and declining price paths in industrial goods.
Proposition 2 characterizes the sensitivity of the optimal technology pricing with respect
to the technology performance improvement α.
Proposition 2 (i) The optimal first-period price is higher if the corresponding performance
improvement is below the threshold αt. W ∗1 (α1) > W
∗
1 (α2) if α1 < αt < α2.
(ii) The second-period price W ∗2 (α) is discontinuous and decreasing at the threshold αt (i.e.,
W ∗2 (αt−) > W ∗2 (αt+))9.
Intuitively, a higher performing future technology reduces the first-period prices, since
only through reducing the current price can the provider induce the customers not to wait
for the future technology. Hence, OEMs pay less for the current technology when the future
offerings are significantly better than the current technology.
Setting lower prices for a superior (future) technology, however, appears to be non-
intuitive. This result stems from the provider inducing an “adopt now” reaction. Under the
saturation strategy, all customers adopt initially and would thus benefit less from improving
their technology again in the second period. Subsequently, the provider optimally reduces
the second-period price.
9Q(α−) and Q(α+) are the left and right hand limits of Q(x) at α.
19
Figure 3 illustrates how the first- and second-period prices (W ∗1 and W
∗
2 ), and the
optimal splitting f∗ are related to the performance increment α. The discontinuity (at
α = 1.9 in the figure) stems from the switching point of strategies at the threshold αt.
Propositions 3-5 build our intuition regarding the effects of development uncertainty and
end-product market size on the introduction strategy. Assume a customer discount factor δ,
probability of delayed launch p, future end-product market size m, technology enhancement
α, and the associated technology progress threshold αt(δ,m). Recall that in our model the
(expected) discount factor δ is decreasing in the probability of delayed launch.
Proposition 3 The probability of delayed launch and the future end-product market size
affect the (i) technology progress threshold, (ii) initial adopters, (iii) first- and second-period
prices, and (iv) provider and OEM revenues, according to the following table:
δ or −(delay probability) future market size (m)
CLAIM 1 αt ↗ ↗
CLAIM 2 f∗ ↗ ↘
CLAIM 3 W1 ↗ ↗
CLAIM 4 W2 ↗ ↗
CLAIM 5 πprovider ↗ ↗
CLAIM 6 πOEM ↘ -
We focus on the leapfrogging strategy region (i.e., α < αt(δ,m)), since for the saturation
region (i.e., α > αt(δ,m)), any small perturbation still results in full adoption. Claim 1
analyzes the effect of lower probability of delayed launch and/or larger size of the end-
product market: The leapfrogging strategy becomes optimal for a wider range of second-
period technologies. Higher probability of delayed launch decreases an OEM’s valuation of
future revenues. Hence, more perceived value in the future, either due to higher m or lower
probability of delayed launch, enables the provider to induce leapfrogging.
The inter-temporal price discrimination literature argues that monopolists may lose
market power when facing rational customers with a high enough discount factor (Coase,
1972; Bagnoli et al., 1989; Guth and Ritzberger, 1998). Coase (1972) conjectured that this
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could even lead to competitive and thus efficient market results. A number of situations
(for example finite collection of customers, finite capacity supplier, increasing marginal cost
of production) have been identified where this conjecture fails to hold. Our findings add to
this list by demonstrating that downstream competition enables the monopolist provider
to undertake a credible inter-temporal price discrimination strategy even when customers
have a high discount factor.
Claim 2 shows that a lower probability of delayed launch results in more customers
adopting initially, and an increase in end-product market size leads to fewer customers
adopting early. An OEM who enters the second period as technologically inferior (i.e., a
first-period non-adopter) is exploited by the provider and accrues lower second-period profits
as compared to the second-period profits of an OEM who adopted in the first period. Hence,
when the probability of delayed launch decreases, the present value of the second-period
profits increases, resulting in OEMs favoring early adoption so as to avoid being exploited by
the provider in the second period. On the other hand, if m increases, the customers would
prefer to own the state-of-the-art technology in the period with the larger end-product
market and would adopt late.
Claims 3 and 4 characterize the effects on the prices. The intuition is similar to the one
presented in claim 2. When the probability of delayed launch decreases (i.e., δ increases),
customers increase their valuation of the second-period profits (and of the second-period
price). Hence, the OEMs will pay a premium for early adoption (and for avoiding the second-
period price). Also, from claim 2, with decrease in the probability of delayed launch, the
number of early adopters increases or, equivalently, the number of late adopters decreases.
But given that the adoption price decreases in the number of adopters, the lower number
of adopters in the second period allows the provider to charge higher second-period prices.
Similarly, when m increases, OEMs would pay more for the second-period technology
since there is a larger end-product market to sell to. Also, from claim 2, increasing m leads
to fewer early adopters. This lower number of first-period adopters enables the provider to
charge a higher price for the first-period technology.
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Claim 5 shows the change in provider revenues. A decrease in the probability of delayed
launch leads to an increase in an OEM’s valuation of future profits. The provider anticipates
that the OEMs have greater incentive for avoiding technological inferiority and paying high
prices for future technology. Hence, the provider can charge a price premium for the first-
period technology. This price premium increases both the revenue per customer and the
total revenue. Similarly, a larger future end-product market size increases the customer
incentives to adopt in the second period. The provider anticipates this customer reaction
and charges a premium, gaining higher revenues.
Claim 6 trivially follows from claim 5 since in the base-case the sum of revenues of the
provider and the customers is constant (=1 + m).
Proposition 4 The technology provider’s revenue is convex and decreasing in the proba-
bility of launch delays.
Intuitively, a higher probability of delays in technology introduction renders the cus-
tomers less likely to be exploited10, since the announcement of launching a better technology
within a short time may not be credible (i.e., in game theoretic terms, with higher proba-
bility of delays, the threat strategy of launching a better technology within a short time is
not credible). Our findings relate to an important managerial implication: Not only does
the revenues decrease with increase in the probability of delays in the launch schedule, the
marginal decrease is decreasing as well. In essence, downstream competition magnifies the
effect that reliability in time-to-market has on profitability and penalizes the provider even
for relatively small delay probabilities. Hendricks and Singhal (1997) have found strong sup-
port for the substantial negative impact of delays in product launches (including industrial
products).
Proposition 5 The provider revenue is not increasing for every technology improvement
(α). That is, {α1 ≥ α2} ; {πp(α1) ≥ πp(α2)}.
10Consider the limiting case p = 1 and d = ∞ (i.e., the technology improvement is never introduced).
Then, the actual announced date of introduction has no effect on the customers’ decision.
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The impact of offering a superior second-period technology on the provider revenues can
be mixed. When the second-period technology is a minor improvement (low α), OEMs face
large competitive pressure to adopt early and avoid becoming technologically laggards, but
for higher α values, this competitive pressure for early adoption declines and the provider
cannot extract the high premium for early adoption. Dhebar (1996) offers qualitative in-
sights into a similar phenomenon in durable goods market with heterogeneous customers.
He argues that too fast introduction of new improved versions can lead to customer regret
and in the long term harm the technology provider. He suggests that there is an “optimal”
pace of product improvement and recommends that decisions on product improvement be
accompanied by a consideration of demand-side effects. Our result demonstrates that in
B2B technology markets with competing customers, setting a sub-optimal pace of product
improvement can reduce the technology provider’s profits by skewing the incentives among
the customers.
2.3.2 Technology Development
In this section we continue the examination of the base-case and examine the provider’s
decision regarding the development effort. In certain industries, technology road-maps
are traditionally not announced, allowing the technology providers to retain considerable
flexibility in deciding both technology development and technology pricing in each period
(e.g., our DuPont example from the chemicals industry).
Assume a deterministic cost of development C(α). With uncertain development costs,
the results presented below remain valid, with C(α) redefined as the expected cost of an
α-increment11.
The technology provider’s technology development decision can be formulated as follows:
α∗ = arg max
α≥1
{max(πp(α), πa(α))− c(α)} (1)
We assume that the technology development decision is made before the first pricing de-
cision. However, the order in which the provider makes the development decision and the
11For instance, suppose G(α, x) is the probability that the cost of developing αT is less than or equal to





first-period pricing decision is irrelevant12.
We prove the next two propositions for quadratic development costs C(α) = c(α− 1)2.
The assumption of quadratic costs is intended only for illustration. Any other parame-
terization of costs of the form C(θ, α) would be sufficient to prove Propositions 6 and 7,
assuming the costs to be supermodular in (θ, α)13.
Proposition 6 The optimal development effort α∗(c) is decreasing in c.
Intuitively, the provider improves the technology in smaller increments when the devel-
opment cost is high. In the limit, as the development costs become very large, the provider
does not pursue significant advances and sells only minor improvements in future periods.
Proposition 7 The technology provider employs a leapfrogging strategy if and only if c is
greater than a threshold ct.
Substantial development costs force the provider to choose a development effort α∗ that
is relatively small (Proposition 6). If α∗ is below the threshold αt, then Proposition 1
suggests a leapfrogging strategy. Thus, in mature markets where the development costs are
substantial, it is optimal to slowly diffuse the current technology through a leap-frogging
strategy.
Proposition 8 offers a sensitivity analysis of the development effort with respect to the
probability of delayed introduction and the end-product market size.
Proposition 8 The optimal development effort α∗(δ(p),m) is an increasing function of the
probability of delayed introduction and an increasing function of m.
A lower probability of delayed introduction drives early adoption and allows the provider
to charge premiums for early adoption, as shown in claim 4 of Proposition 3. This allows the
12Since for an arbitrary function φ(., .), maxα,W1 φ(α, W1) = maxα maxW1 φ(α, W1) =
maxW1 maxα φ(α, W1) if the maximum is attained.
13For instance, consider the family of non-decreasing cost functions λG(α) indexed by the parameter λ.
In this case, equivalent statements of Propositions 6 and 7 would be: (a) the optimal development effort
α∗(λ) is a decreasing function of λ, and (b) the technology provider employs a leapfrogging strategy iff λ is
above a threshold λt.
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technology provider to gain higher revenues without necessarily committing more resources
to development. Thus, with lower probability of delayed introduction, the provider saves
on the extra development costs, while gaining additional revenue due to the early adoption
premium.
In contrast, with an increase in future end-product market size, customers would be
averse to being technologically inferior in the second period, allowing the provider to charge
a higher price. Therefore, providing a superior second-period technology when the OEMs
wish to have the state-of-art technology (i.e., when market size is larger) generates additional
revenues.
2.4 Extensions & Generalizability
In §2.3 we have shown the existence of two distinct strategies - leapfrogging and saturation
- that a technology provider undertakes when introducing a new technology to a market
of competing OEMs. The choice of the optimal strategy was shown to depend on the
magnitude of future technological progress or, equivalently, on the costs, with incremental
technological progress or large technology development costs dictating a leapfrogging strat-
egy and the converse dictating a saturation strategy. Our motivating examples have shaped
the key structure and the assumptions of the base-case model. For instance, the Sorona GT
example conforms very closely to the base-case assumptions.
In this section we extend the base case to study the generalizability of our conclusions
and expand the scope of our findings. The extensions that follow do not explicitly consider
the development costs, and it is assumed that the technology road-map is fixed. However,
as in §2.3.2, if the development costs are assumed to be quadratic (i.e., C(α) = c(α− 1)2),
then the optimal technology development decision α∗(c) is decreasing14 in c. Thus, any
statement about technology enhancement α has an equivalent result in terms of the cost of
development c.
We group the extensions with respect to two features of technology markets - the nature
14α∗(c) = maxα{π(α) − c(α − 1)2}. Since −c(α − 1)2 is submodular in (c, α), α∗(c) is decreasing in c
(Theorem 6 in Topkis, 1978).
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of the technology and the structural characteristics of the OEM market - corresponding to
the two sets of assumptions T.1-T.3 and S.1 we made in the base-case.
2.4.1 Nature of Technology (Assumption T.1, T.2, & T.3)
The base case assumes that (i) the size of the end-product market m and the delay prob-
ability p are independent of the technology αT (i.e., there is no demand growth because
of the innovation and undertaking larger development does not increase the probability of
delays), (ii) there is no possibility of special upgrade prices, (iii) the technology is obtained
for a one-time fixed lifetime usage fee, and (iv) OEMs can integrate the technology into
their current manufacturing process costlessly.
When the technology provider undertakes greater development effort (i.e., α is large),
it is likely that the probability of the delayed launch increases. Similarly, introducing a
superior technology which enhances the OEMs’ end-product quality by a greater amount
lead to an enhancement in demand and market growth.
The ability to offer upgrades is often an inherent feature of the technology or the indus-
try15. For instance, in the case of architectures or IP rights, upgrading may not be feasible
due to issues such as backward compatibility. In industries such as software (e.g., SAP),
however, the existing practice may restrict the technology provider to comply with always
offering upgrades. Also, in many business contexts, the existence of secondary markets
might ensure an implicit upgrading mechanism16.
In technology markets where the physical component (in addition to any intellectual
property usage rights) is sold, typically one unit of “technology” is required to manufacture
one unit of the end-product. In such scenarios, the technology provider may set per-period
usage fees or volume-based royalties. In addition, an OEM still may have to incur substantial
costs17 to integrate a newly adopted technology into his current processes.
15Kornish (2001) offers some attributes of durable goods market that make upgrades infeasible.
16As an example, if the technology in question is heavy equipment, an OEM who acquired an early version
may be able to sell it off in a secondary market before adopting the new version, thus upgrading at a lower
price. For technologies based on IP rights, however, such secondary markets rarely exist rendering an implicit
upgrading unlikely.
17This cost might comprise integration costs, disruption costs incurred due to switching to new technology,
etc.
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We consider these aspects in the three extensions that follow.
Demand Enhancement and Delay Probabilities (Assumption T.1):
Assume that the second-period end-product market size is m(α), and that the probabil-
ity of delayed introduction of technology enhancement α is p(α). The results of the “pricing
game” given in §2.3.1 do not change since αT is assumed fixed in the analysis. Therefore,
the main insight (i.e., leapfrogging vs. saturation depending on the technological progress)
remains valid.
Assume quadratic development costs C(α) = c(α − 1)2. Then, with respect to the
“pricing and development” game presented in §2.3.2, the optimal development decision α∗
is arg maxα{π(α) − c(α − 1)2}. However, since −c(α − 1)2 is submodular in (c, α), α∗(c)
is decreasing in c (Theorem 6 in Topkis, 1978). Hence, the dependence of m and p on
α does not change the main insights (i.e. leapfrogging vs. saturation depending on the
development cost c) of our model18.
Upgrade prices (Assumption T.2):
Assume that in the second period the technology αT is priced at W2−u if the adopting
customer was utilizing technology T , and at W2 if he was utilizing technology 1 (i.e., u is
the price break for upgrading)19. Then, the following theorem analogous to Theorem 1 can
be proved:
Theorem 1′ Given an arbitrary first-period technology T and second-period technology αT
• if α ≤ αt, then the technology provider prices the technologies such that only some of
the OEMs adopt technology T in the first period, while all the n OEMs adopt technology
αT in the second period.
• if α > αt, then the technology provider optimally induces all the n OEMs to adopt T
in the first period and αT in the second period.
Figure 4 illustrates the fraction of first-period adopters and the technology provider’s
revenues as a function of second-period technology enhancement. If the future technology
18The argument also illustrates that in the entire chapter only two of the secondary results given in
Proposition 8 may change if m is assumed to depend on α.
19That is, W1 = {W1} and W2 = {W2, W2 − u}.
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Figure 4: Revenues and optimal number of first period adopters
enhancement is below a threshold, it is optimal to induce only a fraction of the OEM
market to adopt the current technology. Under this strategy the second-period technology
(αT ) is sold to the first-period non-adopters and to the first-period adopters at a reduced
upgrade price. Notice that this optimal introduction strategy is structurally similar to the
leap-frogging strategy, since a part of the OEM market skips over one technology to adopt
future offerings.
Kornish (2001) has found that a durable goods monopolist has a credible inter-temporal
price discrimination strategy only when the monopolist commits to never offer upgrades in
the future. We find that downstream competition enables a credible inter-temporal price
discrimination strategy, even when such a commitment cannot be given and upgrades are
feasible.
Per-period Usage Fees, Volume-based Royalties, and Implementation Costs (As-
sumption T.3):
An OEM who adopts a new technology (T or αT ) incurs an integration cost cI . The
first-period technology T is priced at W1, where W1 is a per-period usage fee (i.e., if an
OEM uses technology T in both periods 1 and 2, the OEM pays 2W1 to the technology
provider)20 The case of volume-based royalties is identical to the per-period usage fees,
20Note that we have assumed that the per-period usage fee is fixed for a particular technology and in-
dependent of the period. This assumption, to our knowledge, is fairly realistic and conforms to the actual
royalties found in practice. Furthermore, since our focus is on the strategic drivers of the introduction strat-















Figure 5: Revenues when price is per-period (cI = 0.04, T = 2, n = 6, δ = m = 1)
and therefore shall not be discussed further. The general nature of this model makes it
analytically intractable. Hence, we utilize numerical analysis to obtain additional insights.
Figure 5 presents an illustrative example. The structure of our main result remains
intact. For very marginal enhancements, the OEMs who adopted technology T do not have
sufficient incentives to adopt αT , since the marginal benefit from improving their technology
is lower than the implementation cost incurred. As a strategic response, the provider induces
all the OEMs to adopt the current (first-period) technology. The technology provider would
not develop a new technology (αT , α > 1) unless the improvement she can offer is above
a threshold. For larger technology increments, leapfrogging becomes the optimal strategy
to pursue. Finally, for very large technology increments, inducing full adoption in both the
periods (i.e., saturation) becomes the attractive strategy.
The existence of per-period pricing or volume-based pricing and significant implemen-
tation costs impact the technology introduction strategy marginally and in an intuitive
fashion. Still, only the basic insights are obtained from this extension, and additional re-
search shall be undertaken in the future to examine the rationale for technology providers
choosing one licensing mechanism over another (for instance, volume-based pricing instead
of a lifetime usage fee).
royalty contracts.
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2.4.2 OEM Market Structure (Assumption S.1)
Next, we consider OEMs who are heterogeneous with respect to their capabilities. This
extension accounts for a richer set of industrial settings and reflects the structure of the
market faced by technology providers such as ARM (in our motivating example). With
heterogeneous capabilities, the quality of an OEM’s end-product Q depends on both the
technology T employed by the OEM as well as his capabilities κ. That is, Q = F (κ, T ).
Due to the complexity of this extension, we employ numerical analysis.
We distinguish between two types of capabilities: those that enhance the value of tech-
nology (such as product development capabilities) and those that act independently of the
technology (such as supply chain efficiency). We call the former capabilities “technology
enhancing” (TE capabilities) and the latter “technology independent” (TI capabilities). TE
capabilities moderate the effect of technology on performance quality, and we model them
as multiplicative; i.e. Q = T × κ. TI capabilities act independently of the employed tech-
nology and have a more direct effect on quality, and hence, we represent them as additive;
i.e. Q = T + κ.
Corresponding to these two types of capabilities, we consider following OEM market
structures: (i) heterogeneity in TE capabilities, that is, the OEMs are heterogeneous only
in terms of their TE capabilities, and (ii) heterogeneity in TI capabilities, where the OEMs
are heterogeneous only in terms of their TI capabilities.
For both these market structures, suppose λn OEMs (high capability, or H OEMs) have
capability κ = κh, and the remaining (1 − λ)n OEMs (low capability, or L OEMs) have
capability κ = κl (κl < κh). Normalize κl to 1 in the case of heterogeneity in TE capabilities
and to 0 in the case of heterogeneity in TI capabilities.
Figures 15 and 16 in the Appendix A present examples out of the many experiments
conducted and illustrate the technology provider’s optimal strategy as a function of future
technology enhancements. The insights obtained from our experiments are summarized in
Table 3.
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Table 3: Technology introduction in heterogeneous markets
Structure of OEM Market Low α High α
Heterogeneity in TE Capabilities
H Leapfrogging Leapfrogging Saturation Saturation Saturation Saturation
L Only T Leapfrogging Leapfrogging Saturation Only T No sale
Heterogeneity in TI Capabilities
H Only T Leapfrogging Leapfrogging Saturation Only T No sale
L Leapfrogging Leapfrogging Saturation Saturation Saturation Saturation
Technology Enhancing capability: With very low future technological increment, the
L OEMs adopt only the initial technology, since without technology-enhancing capabili-
ties they cannot leverage the future marginal technological improvements. The H OEMs,
however, value the technology more and are induced to leapfrog for low future technology
advancements. As future technology enhancement becomes higher, the technology provider
might find it optimal to induce leapfrogging for both types of OEMs, thus milking the value
of current technology over a longer duration. As technology increment becomes still higher,
H OEMs are induced to adopt both the technologies, whereas the L OEMs are induced to
leapfrog. Intuitively, H OEMs value the technology more (because of their higher level of
technology-enhancing capabilities), enabling the provider to gain more revenues by selling
to all of them. For very large values of future technology increments, the provider might
find it optimal to effectively disregard the L OEMs and sell them only the initial technology,
if at all.
Technology Independent capability: With very low future technological increment, the
H OEMs adopt only the initial technology, since they have large technology-independent
capabilities anyway and do not need the marginal technology improvements to compete
effectively. The L OEMs, however, lacking technology-independent capabilities, value the
technology more and are induced to leapfrog for low future technology advancements. As
future technology enhancement becomes higher, the technology provider might find it op-
timal to induce leapfrogging for both types of OEMs, thus milking the value of current
technology over a longer duration. As technology increment becomes still higher, L OEMs
are induced to adopt both the technologies, whereas the H OEMs are induced to leapfrog.
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Intuitively, L OEMs value the technology more (because of their lower level of technology-
independent capabilities), enabling the provider to gain more revenues by selling to all of
them. For very large values of future technology increments, the provider might find it
optimal to effectively disregard the H OEMs and sell them only the initial technology.
Table 3 demonstrates that the structural insights from the base case holds. In addition,
comparing across the two types of market structures (heterogeneity in TI capabilities and
heterogeneity in TE capabilities) in Table 3 reveals an interesting insight. The equilibrium
behavior of OEMs with high (low) TE capabilities is similar to the equilibrium behavior of
OEMs with low (high) TI capabilities. The following observation identifies the main driver
for this insight:
Observation 1 An OEM with high TE capabilities obtains higher marginal benefit from
a given technology and hence has higher incentive to adopt compared to an OEM with low
TE capabilities. An OEM with low TI capabilities obtains higher marginal benefit from a
given technology and hence has higher incentive to adopt compared to an OEM with high TI
capabilities.
This observation is a direct result of the fundamentally different nature of the capa-
bilities. An OEM with higher TE capabilities has greater ability to exploit a technology,
whereas an OEM with lower TI capability has greater need for technology to compete ef-
fectively. Observation 1, together with the optimal strategies outlined in Table 3, suggests
two important managerial guidelines: (i) In technology markets with heterogeneous OEMs,
technology providers should concentrate on OEMs who have high technology-enhancing
capabilities and/or OEMs who have low technology-independent capabilities, and (ii) an
OEM who has low technology-enhancing capabilities can get left behind his competition in
terms of technology.
2.5 Conclusions: Implications for Technology Introduction
In this chapter we have examined the optimal technology introduction strategies for firms
that introduce new process technologies or IP-based architecture/component technologies
to industrial customers (OEMs). In such business contexts, OEMs compete in end-product
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performance, and the underlying technology has a significant impact on the end-product
performance. Hence, the technology provider faces a demand endogenously formed by the
adoption decisions and the strategic considerations of the OEMs. We formulated a two-
period game theoretic model to account for the two main features observed in industry: (i)
downstream competition and (ii) introduction of technology (or technologies) over time.
In this setting, we derived the optimal technology introduction strategies. The main
result suggests a two-fold structure for the introduction strategies: depending on the per-
formance improvement that the future technology realizes, the technology provider either
over-prices initially and induces partial adoption (leapfrogging strategy), or prices low thus
providing sufficient incentives for all the industrial customers to adopt (saturating strategy).
The structure is robust to relaxation of several of our assumptions.
On the theoretical level, we provide the first comprehensive framework, to our knowl-
edge, that simultaneously accounts for the technology introduction and the associated tech-
nology adoption decisions. In addition, our results add to the classic Industrial Organization
(IO) theory of inter-temporal price discrimination by considering competitive downstream
markets.
On the managerial side, starting from a base case and relaxing assumptions gradually, we
build intuition around the phenomenon. Several key insights are drawn from our theoretical
results. Still, as in any analytical model, translation from theory to practice must be done
cautiously, factoring in the limitations that the modeling assumptions impose.
The structure of the optimal strategy suggests that the monopolist technology provider
benefits from a “slow diffusion” in the presence of either (a) significant technology develop-
ment costs, or (b) a technology road-map pre-commitment that dictates future technology
development through small incremental steps. The robustness of this key result to several
extensions verifies its dominant nature. In the limit, when the same technology is offered
over multiple periods, the technology provider finds it beneficial to limit the number of
adopters in each period by utilizing a decreasing price path.
The probability of delayed introduction has a negative impact on the technology provider’s
profits. Our results regarding the convex decreasing structure of profits suggest a severe
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impact of even small probability of delays. Thus, the negative impact of delayed product
launches is further exacerbated by downstream competition. This highlights the significance
of gaining credibility and customer confidence through timely launches, a result that has
been discussed in NPD literature (Hendricks and Singhal, 1997).
Providing better technologies, even if it comes at no additional development cost, may
not always be beneficial for the technology provider. Offering a superior technology in
the future dilutes the internal competition in the downstream market by increasing the
OEMs’ strategic value of waiting (for the future technology). Hence, the provider should
carefully choose the development effort that balance the OEMs’ incentive to wait for better
technologies with their incentive to preempt their competitors (Dhebar, 1996).
Higher future market potential prompts the provider to undertake more development.
Further, a smaller probability of delays in technology introduction enables the technology
provider to gain higher profits with lower development effort. Thus, by being reliable in
their product launch announcements, the technology provider increases her profits while
simultaneously reducing the development effort.
We also have examined the robustness of our main insights by extending the model to
incorporate more general aspects of technology markets. While our main results remain
unchanged for these extensions, additional insights were developed, especially for the case
of OEMs with heterogeneous capabilities21. We identify that the technology provider ben-
efits from inducing by OEMs with high technology-enhancing capabilities (such as product
development capabilities) or OEMs with low technology-independent capabilities (such as
supply chain efficiency or logistics capabilities).
Viewed from the perspective of adoption, OEMs adopt technologies if they can effec-
tively leverage the technologies into their end-products and/or they need the technologies to
compensate for inadequate non-technology related capabilities. Thus, our model suggests
that the presence of high technology-enhancing capabilities and low technology-independent
capabilities is likely to be associated with advanced technologies. Further empirical work
21We are grateful to Vish Krishnan and to the audience at the INFORMS 2004 deep-dive session for
suggesting this extension.
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shall examine this hypothesized linkage between type of capabilities and process/component
technology usage in industrial markets.
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CHAPTER III
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LICENSE TYPES:
CASE OF COMPONENT TECHNOLOGIES
Many industries exhibit a trend of disintegration over time, starting off vertically inte-
grated, and gradually evolving towards a multi-tier disintegrated structure (Christensen,
1994; Christensen et al., 2002). End-product characteristics, such as their (modular) ar-
chitecture, and market attributes, such as increased demand for variety, may drive this
evolution of industry structure, during which many end-product manufacturers (original
equipment manufacturers or OEMs) transform to effective integrators of components and
processes that are procured from outside vendors (Schilling, 2000). The Desktop PC indus-
try provides the canonical example of such a disintegration: OEMs like Dell focus on efficient
integration/assembly, and procure even the core components from specialized technology
firms such as Intel. In such settings, the technology providers who sell (or license) compo-
nent technologies tend to dominate in their own markets, in contrast to their downstream
counterparts (the OEMs) who compete, often intensely, for the end-product consumer.
In this article, we examine the strategic introduction and licensing decisions of technol-
ogy providers who develop and sell (license) component technologies with an identifiable
impact on the end-product performance. The following example from the electronics indus-
try sets the stage for our study. Texas Instruments (TI) sells its Digital Signal Processor
(DSP) solutions to multiple firms, such as Seagate, Maxtor, and Quantum. Industry re-
ports reveal that 95% of all the programmable DSP chips sold into the high performance
hard disk market are produced by TI (TI press release). However, TI’s industrial customers
compete intensely for the same end user market. Also, TI’s component technologies have
significantly altered the competitive dynamics in the hard disk industry: When Seagate
started using TI’s DSP in their product line, the trade press reported that “T320C2xLP
DSP core-based uniprocessor replaces five chips normally inherent in Hard Disk Drives
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(HDD). This uniprocessor design would allow Seagate to drive down costs and speed up the
time to market for new drive designs in a high-volume market” (Electronic News 1996).
The example outlines the following business setting: a near-monopolist technology
provider significantly alters the competitive dynamics in an end-product market by licensing
a highly integrated core component to several competing firms (hereafter OEMs).
The degree of integration, however, need not be the only dimension that makes a com-
ponent valuable to the OEMs. The DSP trade press commented on TI’s varied product
offerings that “TMS320C64x(TM) DSP [offered by TI] operates at 1 GHz and is the ‘fastest
DSP’ in the world,” (PR Newswire 03/15/2004) whereas TI’s TMS320C6412 “[has] a rich set
of peripherals, including an on-chip Ethernet MAC” and “offers a combination of features
that customers have found extremely attractive” (PR Newswire 11/17/2003).
These two typical product offerings allow us to build upon the seminal work of Ul-
rich (1995), and to conceptualize the strategic component development decisions along two
dimensions: (i) what does the component do, or the level of integration offered by the com-
ponent technology (for example, develop a DSP that does core-computing and multimedia
specific tasks), and (ii) how well does it do it, or the performance quality offered by the
underlying technology of a particular component (for example, develop a 1GHz DSP or
equivalently use 45nm transistor technology in the component). Figure 6 illustrates these
two fundamental dimensions of the development decisions in the context of DSPs targeted
toward the scanner market.
The TI setting and its associated component positioning (i.e., integrated vs. perfor-
mance) question is representative of numerous other industries and technologies as the fol-
lowing examples illustrate. In the microprocessor industry, Intel, citing their recent success
with the “Centrino” processor (Centrino combined the traditional microprocessor with wire-
less function) has embarked on a strategy of “platformization” wherein the stated goal is to
offer highly integrated complete solutions to their target markets (Economist, 5/12/2005).
In the hearing-instruments industry, there are around 7 to 8 major end-product man-
ufacturers (OEMs), whereas the core component (transducer) is supplied primarily by a











































Figure 6: Example of a DSP-based Scanner
Figure on the left shows a schematic diagram of the main components of a scanner. The shaded blocks
represent components that TI currently licenses. The two main subsystems are required for the operation
of the scanner, namely the DSP and the pixel co-processor.
The right figure shows the potential development choices available to technology provider. TI may choose
to include the pixel co-processor function in the next-generation DSP (DSP YYY and DSP XXX represent
these choices), or may focus on developing a solution that offers a superior underlying technology without
any functionality enhancements (DSP ZZZ).
provider is a near-monopolist with upward of 80% market-share whereas the downstream
OEM market is a true oligopoly with no one OEM accounting for more than 20% market-
share. Knowles has, so far, maintained the same functionality in their component and has
focused solely on improving the performance (reducing the size) of the core component
technology.
We adopt a multidimensional representation of component technology so as capture the
two main dimensions of the development decision. The first dimension, degree of integra-
tion (i.e., what it does), refers to the amount of end-product functions offered through the
component. The second dimension, improvement in the underlying technology (i.e., how
well does it do it), directly impacts the performance quality associated with the component.
The theoretical foundation for our approach stems from the detailed operational concep-
tualization of product architecture offered by Ulrich (1995). He defines the function of a
product (or a part of the product such as the component in our case) as “what it does as
opposed to what the physical characteristics of the product are” (Ulrich, 1995, p. 420)1.
1For instance, Ulrich uses the example of a trailer specifying elements such as minimize air drag, transfer
load to road, suspend trailer structure etc, as its the functional elements (what we call functionality in our
article).
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Furthermore, he distinguishes between “the choice of functional elements [or functionality
as in our article]” from “the choice of [...] features” (Ulrich, 1995, p. 434).
We examine the primary drivers for the licensing decision faced by a technology provider
who licenses core components to competing OEMs, and we characterize the provider’s
optimal introduction strategies with respect to both the number of OEMs to license and the
mode of licensing (i.e., volume-based royalties versus fixed payments). In addition, we also
offer an interesting typology of technological uncertainty based on its underlying source.
This typology allows us to demonstrate that much of the conventional wisdom touting the
detrimental effects of uncertainty may be applicable only to certain form of uncertainty.
We find that offering a highly integrated component has a dual effect on the technology
provider’s profits. On the positive side, the provider may be able to extract larger “ease-of-
use” rent from the end-product manufacturers as such components are easier to integrate
(lower integration costs/risks) into the end-products. On the negative side, such highly
integrated components may curtail the end-product manufacturer’s ability to differentiate
from his competitors, and thus, may render such components less preferable. Thus, our
results demonstrate that when a component is targeted toward a mass market (i.e., not
intended for just a subset of OEMs), offering additional functionality may not be beneficial
for the technology provider, and sends a cautionary message to technology providers on the
potential pitfalls of “over-integration.”
In our analysis of different licensing forms, we consider licenses consisting of fixed-fees
plus royalties and find that such mixed licenses may be optimal if the technology provider in-
tends to license to large number of OEMs (saturation strategy). Our results offer normative
support to past empirical literature findings of the prevalence of such licensing structures
(e.g., see Rostoker, 1984), and stand in contrast to much of the theoretical prediction from
patent licensing literature from economics that finds volume-based licenses sub-optimal.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In §3.1 we give a brief review of the litera-
ture relating to functionality selection in component technologies and patent licensing. The
model is formulated in §3.2. The two widely used licensing mechanisms in technology mar-
kets, fixed-price and volume-based royalties, are examined in §3.3.1 and §3.3.2 respectively.
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§3.3.3 offers extensions to our stylized model allowing us to explore and verify the validity
of our main results in much more general settings. Furthermore, the extensions also allow
us to offer theoretical closure by presenting the discussion in §3.4 about (i) some of the em-
pirical implications of our results, and (ii) the reasons why firms may choose one component
development strategy over another (for example, Intel has chosen the “integration-driven”
approach whereas Knowles pursues a “performance-driven” component development).
3.1 Literature Review
Three main areas in the academic literature have explored different aspects of our research
question: (i) the new product development (NPD) literature, (ii) the engineering design
literature, and (iii) the patent-licensing literature from economics. A brief review of each
of these is offered next.
Product Architecture in NPD: Ulrich defines the product architecture as “the scheme
by which the function of a product is allocated to its physical components” (Ulrich, 1995,
p. 419). Based on this definition, he proposed an influential conceptual framework for
classifying product architectures. Following Ulrich, we use the term functionality or func-
tional elements of an end-product (or its sub-parts) to refer to “what it does” (Ulrich, 1995,
p. 420). Figure 7 illustrates the conceptual framework for a typical product composed of
multiple components.
Operations management literature has examined the impact of different product archi-
tectures on operational variables such as flexibility, efficiency, profitability, and re-usability.
Baiman et al. (2001) examine the impact of product architecture on supply chain perfor-
mance metrics when each link in the supply chain produces a separate component. Krishnan
and Gupta (2001) and Dana (2003) examine the economic value of having multiple product
groups based on common platforms. Krishnan and Ramachandran (2004) analyze a mo-
nopolist selling design-intensive products (i.e., products where the fixed development cost
outweighs the variable cost of manufacturing) to rational end-product customers. They find
that architectural decisions (specifically, decisions to split a product into modules) can re-



























Figure 7: Conceptual Framework of Product Architecture (adapted from Ulrich, 1995)
The core-component (component 2 in the figure) encapsulates a set of functionalities (functionality 2,3,
and 4) and impact the main competitive dimension (dimension 2) of end-product performance.
strategy. Erat and Kavadias (2005) examine the effect of improving technologies on a tech-
nology providers introduction decisions. They find that when technology improves in small
increments it may be beneficial for the provider to induce a slow diffusion pattern and allow
only a limited number of OEMs to adopt in any period. However, they do not account
for the architectural choices (i.e., decision on functionality set) and limit their analysis to
technology provider’s inter-temporal licensing strategies.
This stream of literature examines the effect of architecture choice in the context of
a single firm. Our emphasis, on the other hand, lies in examining decentralized business
contexts where the architectural decisions (i.e., choice of the set of functionalities and/or
the underlying technology of the component) are made by one firm (technology provider)
whereas the actual end-product manufacturing/assembly is performed by other firms.
Engineering Design: A large body of literature in the domain of engineering design has
examined the product architecture question. Pimmler and Eppinger (1994) describe a nor-
mative approach to the architecture design problem; they use a matrix based formulation
and solve for the optimal allocation of functions to the components. Stone et al. (2000)
develop a heuristic solution for the task of identifying modules from functional descriptions
(i.e., functionalities). Blackenfelt (2000) demonstrates a solution method for the problem
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of optimally allocating functionality between components. The heuristic involves two dif-
ferent techniques: the Design Structure Matrix (see Eppinger et al., 1994) and the Modular
Function Deployment (see Gunnar, 1998).
In contrast to the focus of our study, the techniques (heuristics) found in this stream
of literature have been primarily tactical in nature, and have dealt with the issue of mod-
ularization and architecture design without taking into account any strategic value derived
from the allocation scheme.
Patent Licensing: Since the pioneering work of Arrow (1962) examining the licensing of
cost-reducing innovations, a number of economists have studied when and how innovations
(patents or Intellectual Property rights) are licensed (Kamien and Tauman, 1984; Katz and
Shapiro, 1985). The dominant approach has been to consider an R&D firm who licenses
cost reducing innovations to firms competing à la Cournot. Thus, in this stream of litera-
ture, technology is viewed as unidimensional with a single parameter (cost or performance)
characterizing it. For an extended survey of this stream of literature, see Kamien (1992).
One of the main findings from this stream may be summarized as follows: Volume-
based royalties (i) allieviate two-sided moral hazard, and (ii) share innovation risk optimally
between risk averse agents (see Martin, 1988; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). In the case
of risk neutral agents with complete information (i.e., no private information), Kamien
and Tauman (1986) show that volume-based royalties are in general inferior to fixed-price
licenses.
Empirical studies of patent licensing are few and limited, mainly due to the difficulties
in obtaining detailed contract data. However, the few available studies (e.g., see Rostoker,
1984) do observe that volume-based royalty is an element of most licensing agreements
despite the theoretical prediction of their sub-optimality. For instance, Rostoker (1984)
finds that the fixed-price plus volume royalty is the most frequently used (46%), followed
by pure volume-based royalties (39%).
Despite the empirical observation of the prevalence of mixed licensing mechanisms that
include fixed-fees and volume-based royalty, most past literature has focused on either fixed-
price contracts, or on volume-based royalties, and on comparing between them (see Kamien,
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1992). With a few exceptions (e.g., Kamien and Tauman, 1984), this stream of research has
mostly disregarded the possibility of combining the two mechanisms together. We explicitly
consider such mixed licensing arrangements. Furthermore, instead of focusing on any one
specific competition mechanism among the licensees (such as the Cournot competition as-
sumption common in much of patent licensing literature), we consider a generic competition
mechanism so that our results are generalizable. Lastly, unlike past studies on technology
licensing, we view component technologies as multidimensional and as being characterized
not only by how well they performs (i.e., the underlying performance characteristics), but
also by what they do (i.e., the functionality it provides).
3.2 Model Setup
Consider a monopolist technology provider who offers a component technology C̄ for licens-
ing to n OEMs. For mathematical tractability, we assume a duopoly in the downstream
market, i.e., n = 2.
The component licensed by the provider is one of the many components that comprise
the end-product. Hence, the OEMs undertake further integration/development of the re-
maining components to obtain a fully functional end-product. For example, Nokia, after
acquiring TI’s generic DSP, integrates it with additional components to develop a working
cell-phone.
The component C̄ is represented by the tuple [f, T ], where f is the fraction of end-product
functionality that C̄ offers, and T is the underlying technology utilized in C̄ 2. We assume
that the end-product “performance”3 of the end-product is determined by the underlying
technology utilized in the (core) component, i.e., performance of the end-product P (T ) is
an increasing function of T . Without loss of generality4, let P (T ) = T .
2In the context of PC desktops, suppose that the main functionalities are core computing, wireless, and
multimedia support. If the component C̄ provides the core computing and the wireless functionality, then
f = 2
3
. The underlying technology T may be 90 nm or 40 nm.
3We define the “performance” in terms of the major competitive dimensions of the end-product market.
For instance, if the cost is the basis for competition, then “performance” denotes manufacturing costs,
alternatively if it is quality-based competition, then “performance” refers to performance quality.
4Note that the assumption of linear relationship between P and T , i.e., P = T , entails no loss of
generality. Even if the performance P = P ′(T ′) where P ′(·) is an increasing function, then, by normalizing
the technology T as T ≡ P ′(T ′), we obtain P = T . Intuitively, the technology may be measured in terms of
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Once an OEM adopts the component technology C̄, he5 undertakes integration. How-
ever, the outcome of the integration process is uncertain. This uncertainty stems from one
of the following two sources: (i) component specific uncertainty due to the novelty of the
underlying technology, and (ii) uncertainty arising from the OEM’s integration processes.
The former is component-specific and systemic in nature, i.e., it is common across the users
of the component and is independent of the individual OEM’s integration processes. The
latter, on the other hand, is OEM-specific and idiosyncratic in nature, and depends on the
specific ancillary components that an OEM uses as well as the complexity of his integration
process.
From an empirical standpoint, it may be difficult to quantify the contribution of these
uncertainties. We offer an analogy that clarifies the distinction between them and suggests a
concrete way of quantifying the two proposed forms of uncertainties: Consider the outcomes,
success versus failure, associated with usage of a specific drug. The probability of success
may depend on (a) the dosage, and (b) the patient’s genetic predisposition or medical
history. The former is analogous to the systemic component-specific uncertainty of our
context whereas the latter relates to the idiosyncratic agent-specific and/or integration
process uncertainty. Furthermore, the relative contributions of the two types of uncertainties
may be estimated using design of experiments techniques (e.g., see Fedorov and Leonov,
2001).
Based on this typology of uncertainty, we model the overall uncertainty as follows:
Let pI(f) be the probability that the integration is successful given a perfectly performing
component, and let pC(T ) be the uncertainty associated with the specific component. Then,
pC(T )pI(f) is the overall probability that the integration is successful. We assume that the
OEM’s incur an integration process cost C(f, T ) 6.
A higher fraction of unique components (i.e., lower f) and the associated engineering
its impact on performance.
5For ease of exposition we refer to OEMs as ‘he’ and the technology provider as ‘she.’
6These probabilities and costs are assumed to be common knowledge. Assymetric information and/or pri-
vate knowledge may induce signalling effects. However, since our focus lies in characterizing the main effects,
we abstract away from such informational assymetries and leave their consideration for future research.
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work create a complex planning process that requires more time and resources to com-
plete (Clark, 1989), and may impair the OEM’s ability to accurately judge the component
interactions and integration risks (Schilling, 2000). Furthermore, both the costs and the
uncertainty associated with integration are likely to increase super-linearly with number
of components that are being integrated due to the possibility of exponential number of
interactions7. Thus, we assume that
A0.1: pI(f) is increasing concave in f
A0.2: C(f, T ) is decreasing concave in f
The novelty of the underlying technology may substantially increase the uncertainty and
the integration costs associated with a component:
A0.3: pC(T ) is decreasing convex in T
A0.4: C(·, T ) is increasing convex in T .
We assume that the OEMs compete in a common end-product market and that the
end-product performance is a key determinant of this competition. Let Π(Pi, Pj) be the
payoff to OEM i (i = 1, 2) when his end-product has performance Pi and his competitor j’s
(j = |3− i|) end-product has performances Pj .
Our proposed model of competition, i.e., the payoff function Π(·, ·) is general enough
to include the possibility that the OEMs employ additional levers to manage the compe-
tition. For instance, suppose that the OEMs also have the ability to add extra features
(which are distinct from our definition of functionality) and engage in price competition.
Let Φ (Pi, Pj , λi, λj , wi, wj) be the payoff to OEM i (i = 1, 2) when his end-product per-
formance is Pi, extra features in his end-product is λi, and his price is wi, and his com-
petitor j’s (j = |3 − i|) end-product performance, features, and price are Pj , λj , and
wj respectively. Then, Π (Pi, Pj) is the Nash-Equilibrium outcome of the features selec-
tion + pricing game, i.e., Π (Pi, Pj) ≡ Φ
(
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7Intuitively, the costs and the uncertainty for integrating 2m components are likely to be more than twice
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for i = 1, 2. Note that we implicitly as-
sume that component adoption occurs first followed by the competition between the OEMs,
and that the Nash-equilibrium of the features selection + pricing game is unique.
The structure of the profit function Π(·, ·) subsumes the market (or competition) mech-
anism that allocates profits to the OEMs. Instead of assuming a specific market mechanism
(such as the Cournot or the differentiated Bertrand competition setting), we adopt an ax-
iomatic approach to modelling competition between OEMs and assume a set of intuitive
and fundamental properties that a general market mechanism satisfies. In Appendix B,
we demonstrate that the properties assumed for the market mechanism are indeed general,
and are satisfied by a wide variety of economic models of competition such as differentiated
Bertrand and competitive Logit models frequently employed in Marketing literature. Thus,
our axiomatic approach to modelling competition allows for greater generalizability of our
results.
The assumptions imposed on the competition mechanism Π(·, ·) are given next.




Intuitively, greater end-product performance leads to greater profits, however, the rate
at which the profits increase is decreasing (i.e., the performance exhibit decreasing marginal
returns).




Intuitively, an OEM’s own profits would decrease when his competitor’s end-product
has superior performance. Furthermore, this decrease in profits is likely to be greater when
the competitor’s performance is only marginally superior8.




The performances are weak “substitutes” (i.e., Π(Pi, Pj) is submodular in (Pi, Pj), see
Topkis, 1978, for more on submodular functions and their properties). Intuitively, the
benefit from a achieving a superior performance is greater if the competitor lags significantly
8For example, suppose an OEM’s end-product performance was 1, and his competitor switches from
an end-product of performance 1 to performance 2. Compare this to the situation where his competitor
switches from end-product of performance 100 to performance 101. The convexity assumption implies that
the decrease in profits is the first case (competitor switching from 1 to 2) is likely to be more than the
decrease in profits in the second case (competitor switching from 100 to 101).
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in performance. As an example, consider the case where Seagate uses TI’s superior DSP
and Maxtor switches from using their own low performance solution to TI’s DSP solution.
Contrast this with the case where Seagate is using a low-performance solution and Maxtor
switches to TI’s DSP solution. The benefits would be smaller in the former case than in
the latter.
We normalize the performance of end-products offered currently (i.e., before any adop-
tion decisions) to 1. For ease of notation, let (i) a(T ) = Π(P (T ), P (T )), (ii) b(T ) =
Π(P (T ), 1), (iii) c(T ) = Π(1, P (T )) (iv) d = Π(1, 1), and let S(T ) = a(T ) − c(T ), and
F (T ) = b(T )− d. Thus, S(T ) (F (T )) represents the incremental benefit of the component
licensee when his competitor uses (does not use) the same superior technology. Finally, we
make the following structural assumption of the market mechanism for consistency with
assumptions A1-A3.
A4: F (T )− S(T ) is increasing and convex in T . 9
Assumption A4 states that the relative benefits are increasing in the technology and
that rate of increase is increasing as well. The convexity assumption, though useful in terms
of allowing mathematical tractability, is relatively unimportant for the validity of our main
results as we demonstrate through numerical examples.
The sequence and timing of decisions in the adoption game proceeds as follows. In the
first stage the technology provider introduces the technology C̄ = [f, T ] and sets the license
fees at W̄ . The license fee W̄ = [W,w] is composed of two parts, a fixed one-time payment,
W , paid for the adoption, and a per-unit royalty w, paid for each unit of end-product sold.
After the license fee has been announced the OEMs decide, based on their resultant profits,
whether or not to adopt the technology. Upon adoption the OEMs undertake integration
of the newly acquired component technology into their end-product at cost C(f, T ) and are
successful with probability pC(T )pI(f). In case of success, the adopting OEM utilizes the
9Note that the assumption that F (T ) − S(T ) is decreasing for all T is inconsistent with assumptions
A1-A3 as the following argument shows - Suppose, F (T ) − S(T ) is decreasing for all T . By A1 we know
that F (0) − S(0) = 0. Furthermore, by A3 we know that F (T ) − S(T ) ≥ 0. However, we have assumed
that F (T )−S(T ) is decreasing, and thus we have a contradiction. Thus, F (T )−S(T ) cannot be decreasing
for all T . However, assumption A4 is not redundant since it is possible that F (T )− S(T ) is increasing for
some T and decreasing for others.
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Develop Component [f,T]
Set License fees [W,w]
Adopt new component
Undertake Integration
















Figure 8: Timeline of decisions
newly integrated component in their end-products whereas the older component is employed
in their end-product in case of failure. The end-products are then competitively sold and
revenue is accrued by the OEMs.
3.3 Optimal Licensing Policy
This section examines the optimal licensing strategies. §3.3.1 addresses the case of fixed
one-time payment only (i.e., w = 0) and the case of volume-based royalties plus a fixed one-
time payment is considered in §3.3.2. §3.3.3 extends the basic setup to address the impact of
heterogeneous integration capabilities among OEMs and of the complexity/standardization
of end-product architectures on the provider’s optimal licensing strategies.
3.3.1 Fixed Payment
We consider the case where the technology is licensed for a life-time fee (i.e., W > 0
and w = 0). This model reflects industrial settings where the actual component may be
manufactured by the OEMs themselves and only the Intellectual Property (IP) rights are
transferred from the technology provider to the OEMs for a life-time usage fee.
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Before proceeding further, we offer the following definitions to facilitate the explanation
of the intuition behind our subsequent results.
Definition 1: Even if both OEMs adopt the new component and undertake integration,
there is a chance that their individual integration outcomes are different and their end-
products are differentiated in terms of performance. Define the degree of potential differen-
tiation (if both adopt the same component) as the probability that the integration outcomes
are different:
Degree of Potential Differentiation = 2pCpI(1− pI)
Definition 2: An introduction strategy where the technology provider sets license fees such
that
• all the OEMs attempt integration is termed a saturation strategy.
• only a subset of the OEMs attempt integration is termed a niche strategy.
Proposition 9 describes the (optimal) license fee that the provider charges contingent
on the particular introduction strategy she pursues.
Proposition 9 The technology provider optimally employs the saturation strategy by setting
the license fee W = Ws − C where
Ws = pC(pI(b− d)− p2I((b− d)− (a− c)))
or she may optimally pursue the niche strategy by setting the license fee W = Wn−C where
Wn = pCpI(b− d)
The corresponding technology provider revenues are πs = 2(Ws−C) and πn = Wn−C. The
overall optimal introduction strategy is determined by which of these two strategies generate
higher provider revenues.
Proposition 9 reveals an interesting insight: The technology provider’s revenues decrease
with systemic uncertainty (i.e., πs is increasing in pC). However, the provider revenues,
when employing the saturation strategy, may increase with the idiosyncratic uncertainty
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(i.e., πs may decrease with pI). The differing impact of the two forms of uncertainty is
explained as follows: With lower idiosyncratic (integration) uncertainty, the fate of each
OEMs integration effort depends more on the component uncertainty. Hence, the potential
for a differentiated outcome is smaller with lower idiosyncratic uncertainty. Furthermore,
with lower potential for differentiation, it becomes less likely that any one OEM obtains
highest possible “monopolist” profits (= b(T )). Thus, the lower potential differentiation
leads to the OEMs paying less for the component technology and consequently to lower
revenues for the provider. Lower systemic (component) uncertainty, on the other hand,
benefits the OEMs (and thus the provider) by increasing the potential differentiation. The
insight is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The provider revenues under saturation strategy may decrease in f .
Corollary 2 offers an important managerial insight. While offering greater integration
and enhancing the “ease-of-use” of the component (increasing pC) seems to be a viable
value creation strategy, such an approach need not always be beneficial, since the strategy
also has the indirect effect of diminishing the differentiation and increasing the competition
between OEMs. Thus, the latter indirect effect should also be accounted when a technology
firm embarks on a strategy of offering highly integrated, easy-to-use components.
Theorem 2 characterizes the provider’s strategy as a function of the functionality f and
underlying technology T of the component.
Theorem 2
• There exist thresholds 0 ≤ f0(T ) ≤ f1(T ) ≤ f2(T ) ≤ 1 such that the provider finds it
optimal to (i) undertake the niche strategy if f ∈ [f0, f1] or f ∈ [f2, 1], (ii) undertake
the saturation strategy if f ∈ [f1, f2], and (iii) not to license to any of the OEMs if
f ∈ [0, f0].
• There exist thresholds 1 ≤ T0(f) ≤ T1(f) ≤ T2(f) such that the provider finds it
optimal to (i) undertake the niche strategy if T ∈ [T0, T1] or T ∈ [T2,∞), (ii) undertake
the saturation strategy if T ∈ [T1, T2], and (iii) not to license to any of the OEMs if
T ∈ [1, T0].
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As the component offers superior performance through its underlying technology or
provides greater functionality, the provider finds it optimal to license to more OEMs. How-
ever, for highly-integrated components, any adopting OEM can successfully integrate the
component into their end-product. Due to this, the potential differentiation between the
OEMs decreases causing the competition between them to increase, thus diluting the over-
all value the provider may obtain by licensing to a large number of OEMs. Consequently,
the provider focuses on fewer OEMs when offering a highly integrated component so as to
prevent the downstream competition from increasing too much. Similarly, for drastic inno-
vations, i.e., T À 1, an adopting OEM can become a monopolist and drive his competitors
out of the market. Thus, the provider licenses to only one OEM obtaining all the revenues
from a single OEM.
Proposition 10 characterizes the behavior of the thresholds and allows us to analytically
derive the shape and structure of different regions contingent on the component technology.
Proposition 10
• The thresholds f0(T ), f1(T ), f2(T ) are non-increasing in T .
• The thresholds T0(f), T1(f), T2(f) are non-increasing in f .
Figure 9 illustrates the technology providers’ optimal strategies as a function of the





2 , costs C(f, T ) = 0.8(1−f), and probability of success pI(f) = f (0.9), pC(T ) = 1.
3.3.2 Fixed-fees plus Royalties
In §3.3.1 we assumed that the component technology is licensed for a fixed one-time pay-
ment. This allowed us to abstract away from the complex licensing arrangements often
found in practice and to isolate the effect of the two main development levers available to
the technology provider, i.e., functionality and underlying technology, on her optimal intro-
duction strategy. However, observations from actual technology markets suggest that many









Figure 9: Optimality Regions without volume-based fees
fixed usage fees (Rostoker, 1984). In this section, we consider richer licensing structures,
and examine the impact of the same operational variables, functionality and underlying
technology, on the provider’s optimal choice of the licensing mechanism.
Consider the general license fee structure W̄ = [W,w] where W is the fixed-price compo-
nent and w the per-unit price. Our notation is adjusted to address the case of volume-based
royalties. The payoffs Π(·, ·) may now also depend on the per-unit license-fee charged. The
payoffs may depend on the per-unit license-fee charged since the per-unit fee w, unlike the
fixed-price W (a sunk-cost after adoption), represents (at least part of) the per-unit cost.
Hence, the OEM may increase/decrease the total cost incurred by increasing/decreasing
the volume produced.
An OEM faces demand (i) Da when both he and his competitor have integrated the
component into their end-products, (ii) Db when he has integrated the component into his
end-product whereas his competitor has not, (iii) Dc when he does not have the component
and his competitor does, and finally (iv) Dd when both he and his competitor do not utilize
the new component. 10
10Note that the demands Da, Db, Dc depend on w, T .
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Let a(T, w), b(T, w), c(T, w), and d be the revenues when the per-unit price of w is
charged. Hence, an OEM’s net payoffs when both are successful in integration is a(T,w)−
Daw. Similarly, the net payoffs for the other three cases are b(T,w) −Dbw, c(T,w) and d
respectively. Also, as before, let F (T, w) = b(T,w)−d and S(T, w) = a(T,w)− c(T, w) rep-
resent the increase in OEM revenues upon adoption contingent on his competitor’s adoption
decision.
Finally, we make the following intuitive assumptions about the impact of the royalty fee
w on the OEM payoffs.
A5.1 b(T, w) is decreasing in w. That is, ∂b∂w < 0.
A5.2 c(T, w) is increasing in w. That is, ∂c∂w > 0.




Paying a higher royalty fee is likely to reduce the OEM’s payoff since it increases the
variable cost of his end-product and leads to either lower margins or higher prices with
lower sales. In contrast, when the competitor pays higher royalty, the OEM’s own payoffs
are likely to increase.
The effect of the royalties on the revenues is less clear when both OEMs adopt. For very
high royalties (i.e., high effective variable costs), it is likely that the each OEM’s demand
diminishes (irrespective of competitor’s costs), as the customers would not buy the end-
product even if priced at cost thus leading to lower payoffs. However, when the royalty
is low, it is likely that small increases of royalty may actually lead to increases in payoffs.
As an example, suppose the OEMs are Bertrand competitors and that the variable cost
and the royalty for the end-product are 0. The competition between the OEMs is likely
to be intense and result in low (near-zero) payoffs. However, if the royalty is increased to
ε, the OEMs cannot price lower than the per-unit-cost ε, thus leading to higher payoffs
(= ε × market-size2 ). Thus, we make the assumption that the payoffs are concave in the
industry costs (i.e., potentially increasing initially, but ultimately decreasing).
Propositions 11 characterizes the type of license the technology provider offers so as to
induce a particular adoption equilibria.
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Proposition 11
(A) A license fee W̄ = [W,w] induces a saturation strategy iff
pC
(
p2IDaw + pI (1− pI) Dbw
)
+ W ≤ pC
(
pIF (w)− p2I (F (w)− S (w))
)− C
or it induces a niche strategy if
pCpIDbw + W ≤ pCpIF (w)− C











and her optimal profits if she uses the niche strategy is
πn = pCpIF (w = 0)− C
Proposition 11 reveals an interesting insight into the problem structure: the actual de-
mand does not appear in the provider’s profit function. Intuitively, the volume-based royalty
allows the provider to appropriate the entire increase in revenues. Thus, the dependence of
demand on providers profit is only through its effect on the total revenues. Furthermore, the
profits under the two strategies retain the same structure as in the fixed-payment case. The
following corollary characterizes the conditions under which the different licensing schemes
are optimal.
Corollary 3 A one-time licensing fee is optimal when the technology provider undertakes
the niche-strategy. However, when the technology provider undertakes the saturation strat-
egy, she may charge a royalty w > 0 in addition to the fixed-price.
Thus, a licensing scheme with only fixed-prices is optimal under the niche-strategy.
Volume-based licenses, on the other hand, is desirable only when the component is in-
tended for multiple OEMs. Intuitively, volume-based royalties when used together with
saturation strategy artificially inflates the per-unit cost for the entire industry (i.e., for all
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the OEMs) and potentially increases the total industry revenues (i.e., sum of revenues of all
the OEMs =a(T, w)+a(T, w)). Furthermore, the fixed-fee allows the technology provider to
appropriate this revenue increase. However, when employing the niche strategy, the familiar
phenomenon of double marginalization results in the revenues decreasing as the royalty (per-
unit cost) increases, thus deterring the provider from employing a volume-based licensing
mechanism. The insight bears significant managerial implication: the technology provider
may use the additional lever of volume-based royalties to manage the level of inter-firm
competition and control the licensees’ revenues. Therefore, the appropriate choice of the
licensing mechanism requires an understanding of the extent and intensity of competition
among the OEMs.
In the complete information case with risk neutral agents, Kamien and Tauman (1986)
find that licensing based on volume-based royalties is in general inferior compared to fixed-
price contracts. Economists have proposed two reasons - moral hazard issues with assymet-
ric information and optimal sharing of risk between risk-averse agents - to justify incentive
contracts (like royalty contracts) in technology licensing. In addition to these compelling
justifications for the existence of royalty-based contracts, our results allow us to propose
an additional reason: royalty-based contracts allow the technology provider to modify and
moderate the competition between the adopting OEMs. Furthermore, our results demon-
strate that weakening two common assumptions in licensing literature (Cournot competition
between OEMs, and contract structures with only one type of licenses) alters the results sig-
nificantly, and that in some cases, the combination of volume-based licensing and fixed-fees
does indeed generate more revenue than fixed-fees alone. Thus, our results demonstrate
that the two mechanisms, volume-based royalties and fixed-fees, are not substitutes and
serve complementary functions, with volume-based royalties being used for managing com-
petition between licensees and controlling the licensees’ revenues and fixed-fees being used
in appropriating these revenues.
Theorem 3 extends Theorem 2 to the case where the provider uses volume-based royalties
in addition to a fixed one-time fee. Also, Proposition 12 analytically characterizes the shape
of the different optimality regions by obtaining threshold sensitivity results.
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Theorem 3
• There exists thresholds 0 ≤ f0(T ) ≤ f1(T ) ≤ f2(T ) ≤ 1 such that the provider finds it
optimal to (i) undertake the niche strategy iff f ∈ [f0, f1] or f ∈ [f2, 1], (ii) undertake
the saturation strategy iff f ∈ [f1, f2], and (iii) not license to any of the OEMs iff
f ∈ [0, f0].
• There exists thresholds 1 ≤ T0(f) ≤ T1(f) ≤ T2(f) such that the provider finds
it optimal to (i) undertake the niche strategy iff T ∈ [T0, T1] or T ∈ [T2,∞), (ii)
undertake the saturation strategy iff T ∈ [T1, T2], and (iii) not license to any of the
OEMs iff T ∈ [1, T0].
Proposition 12
• The thresholds f0(T ), f1(T ), f2(T ) are non-increasing in T .
• The thresholds T0(f), T1(f), T2(f) are non-increasing in f .
The optimal strategy (i.e., saturation vs. niche) retains the same structure as in the case
of only fixed one-time license fees. The discussion and the intuition mirror those offered for
Theorem 2 and Proposition 10.
The next proposition characterizes the dependence of royalty on the functionality f of
the component.
Proposition 13 There exists a threshold fv(T ) such that volume-based royalties are opti-
mal iff f ≥ fv(T ).
Past literature suggests that the value of royalty contracts comes from their ability to
provide incentive/contingent licensing agreements (e.g., see Kamien and Tauman, 1984).
That is, by using the royalty contracts, the provider reduces the risk to the OEMs since
they have to pay only upon successful integration. Our results indicate that royalty-fee is
present only when integration risk is low (w > 0 when pI(f) > pI(fv(T ))). Thus, our results
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Figure 10: Regions when licensing may also include volume-based royalties
may still be appropriate even when integration risk is low since such fees may serve to
moderate the competition between the OEMs.
Our previous results (Corollary 3, Proposition 13, Theorem 3 and Proposition 12) allow
us to construct optimality regions, shown in figure 10, for the optimal licensing strategy.
3.3.3 Impact of Other Product and Market Specific Variables
We have assumed so far that the complexity of the (architectural) interfaces in the end-
product is exogeneously specified. Furthermore, the OEMs and their integration capabilities
are identical. In this section, we explicitly revisit these assumptions and address the impact
of these product and market specific variables on the optimal licensing strategies. Due
to the additional analytical complexity introduced by accounting for these extensions we
shall restrict attention only to the case of fixed license-fees (i.e., throughout this section we
assume that w = 0).
Product integration is likely to exhibit lower uncertainty when the product architecture
is mature and its interfaces are standardized. We let K proxy the complexity of the in-
terfaces and assume that the probability of success from the integration effort is pI(f, K);
with pI(f,K) is decreasing in K. Furthermore, we assume that pI(f, K) is submodular in
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(f,K) (i.e., ∂pI∂f∂K ≤ 0). Intuitively, the effect of architectural complexity is lesser on highly
integrated components compared to less integrated components11.
In similar vein, the heterogeneity in (integration) capabilities of the OEMs is proxied
through a cost differential parameter κ. Let the integration cost for OEM 1 be C(f, T )−κ,
and for OEM 2 be C(f, T ) + κ.
Propositions 14 and 15 address the effect of architectural complexity and heterogeneity
in capabilities.
Proposition 14
Greater product architecture complexity K leads to
• larger no-sale region
• smaller niche region.
• larger saturation region
Intuitively, as interfaces become more standardized (i.e., architectural complexity K is
low), the technology provider is able to introduce lower functionality component (involv-
ing greater OEM integration) and still gain positive revenues. Thus, the no-sale region
diminishes.
When the interfaces becomes more standardized or equivalently when the probability of
integration becomes high for both OEMs (pI ≈ 1), the differentiation potential (= 2pCpI(1−
pI)) becomes low. Hence, the OEMs perceive a lower potential for differentiation, and thus
lower chances of accruing high (monopolist) profits. As the reaction, the provider realizes
less value in licensing to large number of OEMs. Therefore, more standardized architectural
interfaces (i.e., lower architectural complexity K) leads to the saturation-strategy region
diminishing and the niche-strategy region increasing.
11The assumption of submodularity is a relatively weak one. For instance, it is satisfied if the function is
















Figure 11: Changes in Optimality Regions with decrease in architectural complexity
Figure on the left shows the regions for a specific architectural complexity K. The right figure shows
the changes in the regions when the architectural complexity is K ′ (< K). As can be observed, the
saturation-region shifts right, but also shrinks; the no-sale region shrinks; and the niche-region becomes
larger.
Proposition 15
Greater heterogeneity of OEM capabilities κ leads to
• smaller no-sale region.
• larger niche region.
• smaller saturation region.
Intuitively, if the OEM capabilities are more heterogeneous, the provider is able to
assure herself of revenues even upon introducing a more difficult to integrate component
(i.e., component requiring more costly integration) since the more capable OEM can still
profitably use the component. Thus, the no-sale region diminshes.
Similarly, as the OEMs become more heterogeneous, the provider finds saturation strat-
egy less appealing as it requires her to price the component lower so as to be adopted even
by the lower capability OEM. Thus, more heterogeneous OEM market lead to niche-region
becoming larger and saturation-region diminishing.
The insights from Propositions 14 and 15 are summarized in Figures 11 and 12. These in-
sights are relevant from the descriptive standpoint in allowing us to understand and explain
















Figure 12: Changes in Optimality Regions with increase in OEM heterogeneity
Figure on the left shows the regions for a specific OEM heterogeneity value κ. The right figure shows the
changes in the regions when the OEM heterogeneity is κ′ (> κ). As can be observed, the saturation-region
and the no-sale region shrinks whereas the niche-region becomes larger.
Furthermore, they allow the management to consider and account for architectural features
and the state of OEM capabilities when outlining a licensing strategy.
3.4 Discussion & Conclusions: Implications for Compo-
nent Providers
This article focuses on the licensing of new component technologies to industrial markets of
competing manufacturing firms. We build upon the standard economic models of licensing
(e.g., see Kamien and Tauman, 1984) utilizing a multidimensional representation of com-
ponent technology that captures both what the component does (functionality) and how
well it does it (underlying technology). Also, to enable greater generalizability, we consider
a general competition mechanism instead of any one specific competition model. Lastly,
we consider explicitly licensing structures where a fixed-fee is charged in addition to the
volume-based royalty.
We derive the optimal introduction strategy given the different operational and mar-
keting levers that the technology provider has at her disposal: (i) product features such as
underlying technology performance and the functionality, and (ii) different licensing mecha-
nisms. Our results provide important managerial insights along two dimensions summarized
below.
60
3.4.1 Integrate or Not
Some technology providers have recently started shifting their technology focus towards of-
fering greater functionality in their component technologies. For instance, Intel, citing their
recent success with the Centrino technology (which combines the traditional microprocessor
with wireless functionality), has announced a new “platformization” strategy suggesting a
strategic shift towards augmenting superior performance with additional and richer func-
tionality.
However, such strategic shifts towards greater functionality is not universal. In the
hearing instruments industry, Knowles, the dominant core component technology provider
with upward of 80% market-share, employs an approach diagonally opposite to Intel’s strat-
egy. In an extended case-study, Lotz (1998), states that “[Knowles has] has maintained the
same functionality in a component, and concentrated on making it smaller and smaller.”
This focus on improving the underlying performance instead of enhancing the functional-
ity highlights the stark difference between their “performance-focused” strategy and Intel’s
“platformization” strategy. Though, numerous justifications may exist for this, our results
allow us to identify some of the reasons for these differences in strategies.
Intel’s microprocessor and the associated end-product have significantly less complex
product interfaces compared to the interfaces in the Knowles’ hearing instruments. Our re-
sults indicate that less complex product interfaces diminish the effect of integration decision
(f) on the intergration risk (p(f,K)), and consequently lead to larger saturation regions.
Thus, Intel, by the nature of the end-product that its components are employed in, may be
less adversely affected by loss of market share despite its functionality decision.
However, one of the main insights derived from our analysis is the danger of “over-
integration.” This may lead to loss of differentiation among the OEMs and consequently
lower profits for the provider. Since Intel finds itself in the saturation strategy already, ad-
ditional integration presents an important challenge in terms of allowing sufficient flexibility
for Intel’s industrial customers to differentiate.
The results obtained from the current study also provide us with the basis for offering
empirically testable propositions relating to the effects of integration.
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P1: Integration has a positive effect on the provider’s profits if she is a niche player.
P2: Integration has a weaker effect on provider’s profits if she is a saturation player com-
pared to the case where she is a niche player.
An empirical test of the propositions may be conducted by analyzing the effect of in-
tegration on profits using the market-share (which proxies whether or not the firm is a
saturation or niche player) as a moderating variable.
3.4.2 Role of Royalties
Our results on the licensing mechanism suggest an interesting dual role for royalties. Past
literature has treated the superiority of royalty primarily through the lens of moral hazard
and risk sharing. Our framework offers an alternate explanation: the royalty structure is
not only a value appropriation mechanism, but also serves as a value creation mechanism.
It allows the technology provider to actively modify and moderate the competition intensity
between her customer OEMs. The insight supports the dominance of royalties attested by
Rostoker (1984).
Our results relating to the use of royalties are summarized in the following empirically
testable propositions.
P3 Royalty would be associated with Saturation Strategy.
P4 Royalty would be associated with greater competition intensity.
In this article, we have developed a model of introduction and licensing of component
technologies while explicitly accounting for competitive interactions between the potential
licensees. We utilize an operational perspective of component technologies, which captures
the essential multidimensional aspect of components, to offer managerial intuition into the
licensing phenomenon. Still, as with any other mathematical model of real-world phe-
nomenon, the results are subject to the limitations imposed by our modelling assumptions
and caution must be exercised when translating our results into real-world contexts.
Models of licensing, to our knowledge, have disregarded the negotiation process that
often accompanies technology licensing. Such considerations must be accounted for in fu-
ture research both from a normative perspective to understand how licensing should be
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conducted and from a descriptive perspective to understand the broader implications of
negotiations in technology licensing. Furthermore, there is a lack of empirical verification
of much the theoretical predictions of licensing literature. Thus, empirical verification of
the relationships we proposed remains part of our future research agenda.
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CHAPTER IV
TECHNOLOGY CODEVELOPMENT: CASE OF
REVENUE/COST SHARING AGREEMENTS
Codevelopment is the mechanism by which two (or more) independent economic entities
engage in a non-equity based, short-lived, collaborative project designed to exploit a specific
market opportunity. In the recent years there has been a spate of such activities as confirmed
by the National Science Foundation’s whitepaper titled Science and Engineering Indicators
(2004). Figure 13 also seem to indicate that the number of such codevelopment activities
is on the rise over the past several years and underscore the importance of understanding
how such collaborative projects may be managed.
A number of reasons such as time-to-market, access to complementary resources, and
ability to share market/technical risk have been cited for the increase in number of non-
equity based, short-lived, collaborative product development projects. In this chapter, we
examine settings of codevelopment where two independent firms engage in a joint effort to
exploit a specific market opportunity while facing both internal (development) and external
(market) uncertainty. We construct a model that captures the main operational dimensions:
individual effort levels and the timing and terms of the contract required to ensure resource
commitment from the other party.
Our main result indicate that uncertainty, both in the product development process and
the market estimates, play an important role in when and what contract is negotiated. In
the presence of high uncertainty the firms may find it optimal to delay the contract signing
till uncertainty is sufficiently resolved. However such delays may also lead to each firm
expending lesser resources (holdup problem) as payoffs are not guaranteed. Optimally de-
layed contracts represent, to our knowledge, a new result that arises endogeneously through
explicit consideration of the important product development variables of uncertainty.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In §4.1 a summary of a case study of a
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Figure 13: Industry Trends in Co-development
specific codevelopment project and some key observations about the same is offered. §4.2
reviews some key literature from economics and marketing that have examined the mecha-
nism of contracting and reasons for potential delays in reaching agreements in collaborative
situations. The main results are derived in §4.4. §4.5 concludes by offering the practical
and theoretical implications of the main findings of the study.
4.1 Delta-3M Codevelopment: A Case Study
On September 3rd 1998, Swiss Air flight 111 with service from New York JFK to Geneva,
plunged into the Atlantic Ocean off Nova Scotia shortly after takeoff. The Canadian Trans-
portation Safety Board (TSB) conducted an extensive investigation into the causes for the
crash and concluded that the culprit was a cabin-fire due to an electrical spark. The specific
type of insulation material used (a form of polymer called metallized polyethyleneteraph-
thalate or MPET) allowed an electrical spark to quickly turn into a cabin-fire shorting out
the electronic systems and causing malfunctioning of the aircraft control systems. TSB,
subsequent to their investigation, recommended that such insulation be removed and im-
posed stringent safety standards on the insulation used in aircrafts (TSB recommendation
65
A99-07).
In the United States, FAA followed up with airworthiness directives (AD 2000-11-01
and AD 2000-11-02) applicable to certain classes of McDonnell Douglas aircrafts that man-
dated a determination of whether and at what locations the MPET insulation blankets are
installed, and the replacement of all such insulation blankets. The initial directive required
this to be carried out in 4 years, but subsequent industry pressure and the enormous costs
that airlines would incur in following this directive convinced FAA to extend the compliance
time to 5 years.
The solution that the aircraft manufacturer, Boeing, introduced was costly both in terms
of actual price and in terms of maintanence time required. Delta TechOps, a division of
Delta Airlines specializing in aircraft maintanence, decided to work with 3M to joint develop
and market an alternate solution. The alternate solution, named Nextel Flame Shield, was
a type of ceramic paper that offered a durable, easy-to-install, lightweight barrier that
would isolate the MPET from ignition sources. Since the installation time required for
this alternate solution was considerably shorter, the aircrafts could return to service much
sooner thus reducing the overall cost on the airlines.
The development, which required the two partners to interact and exchange information
on a frequent basis, was started off with a simple memorandum of understanding without
agreeing to any of the specific details of how costs would be split and/or revenues shared.
Since time-to-market was considered to be an important concern, these contract details
were to be negotiated later and was not allowed to hold up the product development. An
attempt was made to keep track of each partners contribution, but was quickly abandoned
after the data grew unmanageble and it became clear that it was nearly impossible to reach
consensus on who originally proposed a certain idea.
Despite the best efforts of both legal teams to reach an agreement on the exact details of
cost/revenue sharing, negotiations went on till nearly the end of the product development.
This observation - contracts may not always be signed before starting a codevelopment
project and may be left out for future negotiation - is not isolated to the Delta-3M case
study we conducted. Academic literature have long recognized the classic holdup problem
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where firms would be unwilling to allocate resources without ensuring that they are able
to appropriate rents. However, our observation seems to run counter to the conventional
reasoning behind the holdup problem. This study examines a setting where a negotiation
process runs parallel to the product development process, and it tries to resolve this apparant
violation of holdup argument and to determine the reasons (if any) for signing contracts later
in the NPD process. Furthermore, the study also examines the implications to profitability
due to delayed contract.
4.2 Literature Review
There are two main streams of literature that are relevant to our research question. From
the methodological perspective economists have examined negotiation processes and have
obtained sharp results pertaining to delays in signing contracts. A seminal article by Ruben-
stein (1982) proposed an extensive form game involving alternating offers that had a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium consistent with the cooperative nash bargaining solution. One
key property of the Rubenstein equilibrium is that there are no delays in reaching an agree-
ment on the division of payoffs. Since then a number of economists and game theorists
have studied the causes for delays in bargaining and posited information assymetry as one
of the reasons. The main finding arising from such a modelling approach is the existence of
multiple equilibria some of which exhibit delays (see for example Admati and Perry, 1987).
However, the explanation of assymetric information has been generally viewed as unsatis-
factory by most economists, possibly because such multiple equilibria offer little guidance
to prediction (Gul et al., 1986; Gul and Sonnenschein, 1988). For a more complete review
of the bargaining literature and the mixed findings see Binmore (1987), Roth (1985).
The main finding from the game theoretic bargaining literature can be summarized as
follows: With no information assymetry, contracts are always signed beforehand, and even
with information assymetry, delays are not necessarily present for all the equilibria. Our
case study illustrates that when the joint effort is between two parties who have collabo-
rated before (which might proxy lack of significant information assymetry relating to firm
capabilities), there may still be significant delays in signing contracts. Thus, we focus on
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the product development settings exemplified by the case study, and we analyze situations
of codevelopment while accounting for key product development variables such as inter-
nal (development) and external (market) uncertainty. We find that delays may in fact be
optimal, and thus that the product development process has some unique effects on the
bargaining process that have so far not been captured in economic models of bargaining.
The topic of joint product development (and in specific joint ventures) have received
much attention from the strategy literature (Gulati, 1998). The focus within this stream
has been to find variables, such as trust (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) and complementary
goals (Gates, 1993), complementary resources (Dyer and Singh, 1998), that explain joint
development success. Our focus, in contrast, is more process-based and involves examining
the joint product development process to both explain rationales for delayed contracts and
for offering managerial recommendations for when negotiation should be completed and
when it should be aggressively pursued.
4.3 Model setup
Consider two firms A and B who decide to jointly develop a new product. We assume that a
loose Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is signed allowing the firms to work together
without requiring any firm commitment of resources and/or commitment to how potential
profits may be shared.
Following a process-based view of product development, we assume that the product
development is a stage-gate process with milestones after each significant development step.
For ease of exposition, we consider a two period model and assume that resources may
be deployed in the two periods towards the joint development effort. The model setup
is split into three parts: (i) characteristics of the development efforts, and how individual
efforts map onto the final joint value of the development project, (ii) features of information
acquisition associated with the temporal process nature of the joint product development,
and (iii) the negotiation process and the type of contracts that may be agreed on.
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4.3.1 Individual Development efforts and Value of Project
Let the resource commited towards the joint product development during stage i (i = 1, 2)
by firm A be riA. The performance enhancement in firms A’s contribution resulting the
resource commitment of riA is random and equal to P(riA).
The total revenue that may be obtained from the joint development is given by
Π = MV (P(r1A) + P(r2A),P(r1B) + P(r1B))
where M is a random variable representing the (uncertain) market potential, and V (PA, PB)
represents the revenue that can be realized from a single customer when the firm A’s total
contribution is PA and B’s total contribution is PB.
4.3.2 Information Acquisition and the Development Process
For concreteness assume that the development uncertainty may be represented as follows:
P(r) = r + η where η is drawn from a normal distribution with mean 01. Furthermore,
suppose that the market potential M is given by m + ε1 + ε2. Thus, the market potential
M consists of two parts: a deterministic part m, and an uncertain part ε1 + ε2 where ε1
and ε2 are normal random variables with mean 0.
An important aspect of the process-based view of product development is its temporal
nature. Thus, we assume that uncertainty gets (gradually) resolved over time as information
is accumulated. Hence, the development uncertainty represented through ηiA is revealed
at the end of period i and can be observed by both parties. Similarly, although at the
beginning of period 1 both ε1 and ε2 are uncertain, the firms are able to partially resolve
the market uncertainty at the end of period 1 through information collection. Thus, ε1 may
be observed at the end of period 1 by both parties.
We have purposely disregared accounting for any information assymetries about the ca-
pabilities (and/or cost structures) for two reasons: (i) in contexts such as the codevelopment
effort by Delta and 3M, the long relationship the firms have had prior to the codevelopment
1The requirement of normal distribution is purely for the purposes of exposition. The results can be
shown to hold for a much larger set of two parameter distributions characterized by location and scale
invariance (i.e., distributions which can be normalized to have mean 0 and variance 1). For a more technical
treatment of location and scale invariant distributions see Meyer (1987).
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project makes it less likely that there would be information assymetries between the part-
ners, and (ii) economics literature has demonstrated that information assymetries result in
signalling behavior that may lead to delayed contracts. Our focus is on understanding the
effects of NPD variables on the contract negotiation process, and thus we have chosen to
disregard the well-understood effect of information assymetries.
4.3.3 Negotiation Process and the Contract
The contract that splits the total proceeds and allocates the efforts (development tasks)
may be signed at any stage of the development process. Thus, the contract may be signed
(i) before any resources are deployed (i.e., before period 1), or (ii) when the project is going
on (i.e., after period 1) or (iii) after the project is completed (i.e., after period 2). We
assume that if no agreement can be reached even at the end of the project, then no value
is created for any of the parties (i.e., outside option has economic value 0).
We assume that when a contract is signed, it should specify (i) the efforts in each of the
remaining periods for each party (i.e., riA and riB), and (ii) the division of final revenues
(ΠA and ΠB).
Following Rubenstein (1982), we consider a negotiation process where at each stage one
party can make an offer which the other party may accept or reject. If the offer is accepted,
then the efforts are expended based on the contract terms, otherwise if the offer is rejected,
the firms may individually choose whatever effort levels they want (including not putting
any effort), and the game moves onto the next stage.
The probability of firm A making an offer at any stage is p. Note that p may be
interpreted as the negotiation power of firm A, and that p = 12 implies equal negotiation
power. This specification has been used in past literature to force symmetry between
the players Binmore (1987). The current analysis examines the case of equal negotiation
power (p = 0.5) representing codevelopment partners of equal size. In a research study
currently underway, we attempt to evaluate the effect of assymetric power (for instance



































































Figure 14: Sequence of decisions for the Codevelopment Process
Figure 14 shows the timing and sequence of decisions in the negotiation and product
development game. Before the project has commenced both parties may observe the de-
terministic part of the market potential m. One of the firms propose a contract which the
other party accepts or rejects. In case of acceptance of contract terms, the contract is signed
and effort is expended as mandated by the contract. Otherwise, each firm may individually
(and independently) decide how much effort to dedicate2.
After the first period, the firms may again observe the outcome from their efforts (i.e.,
P (r1A) and P (r2A)). Furthermore, a part of the market uncertainty ε1 is also resolved and
may be observed by the two parties. One of the firms again proposes a contract that the
other firm may accept or reject. In case of acceptance, effort mandated by the contract is
expended, otherwise the game continues with each firm independently deciding the effort
to expend in the second period.
2Note that the firms may even decide to devote no effort in case no contract has been signed so far.
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4.4 Optimal Length of Negotiation Period
One of the fundamental reasons often advocated towards joint product development is
possible complementary capabilities. We employ the functional form V (·, ·) to model the
possible synergies that may exist between the two firms product development capabilities.
If the firm’s efforts are complementary, the revenue function V (·, ·) will be supermodular.
For instance, if the resources are aimed towards developing complementary sub-components
(such as software and the hardware to run it on), it is likely the case that V (PA, PB) will
be supermodular in (PA, PB).
On the other hand, if the resources are being committed towards efforts that are sub-
stitutes it is likely the case that V (·, ·) is submodular. As an example consider two firms
simultaneously searching for a solution with the understanding that the better of the two
solutions will be employed. This function, max{PA, PB}, is submodular.
We analyze these two settings below.
4.4.1 Case of Complementary Efforts/Capabilities
In Theorem 4 and 5 we characterize the length of negotiation period and when the contract
would be signed.
Theorem 4 A mutually acceptable contract will be offered by the (random) proposer at the
beginning of period 2 if no contract has been signed earlier.
Theorem 4 states that the negotiations are never delayed till the end of the project.
Intuitively, the rationale for delaying the negotiations is so as to resolve market and/or
development uncertainty and to take actions contingent on the newly revealed situation.
However, delaying it beyond period 2 yields no benefits as all the actions have already been
taken by period 2. Hence, contracts are never delayed beyond the end of the project.
Theorem 5 A mutually acceptable contract will be offered by the (random) proposer at the
beginning of period 1 if (i) σ(η1·) ≤ σ∗1, or (ii) σ(ε1) ≤ σ∗2
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Theorem 5 states that there is a threshold uncertainty below which the partners would
not wish to delay contracting. However, when either the market uncertainty or the devel-
opment uncertainty is beyond a threshold, contracting can be delayed till beginning of 2nd
period at which time the uncertainty would be at least partially resolved3.
Propositions 16 and 17 offer results that allow interesting comparisons to past results
from real options and economics literature.
Proposition 16 The value of the joint development effort is increasing in the market un-
certainty σ(ε1).
Proposition 17 The resources committed by the partners are higher when operating under
a contract than without.
The first result is similar to the real options literature which suggests that value of a
project increases with market uncertainty. This occurs because with higher uncertainty,
the upside becomes higher and can be exploited by suitable decisions. The second result is
identical to the classic holdup/free-rider problem studied in economics.
Uncertainty, as often seen in real options literature, has the ability to enhance the
value of delayed decisions. Furthermore, uncertainty also has an impact on holdup problem
possibly aggravating it. In the case of supermodular functions our results indicate that
the first effect (value enhacement due to real options result) dominates. This comes about
because the holdup problem is not very dominant in the supermodular settings as the efforts
are actually complements. However, our numerical examples suggest that, for a subset of
submodular functions, the holdup problem may become dominant decreasing the value of
a project as uncertainty increases.
4.4.2 Case of Substitute Capabilities
Due to mathematical intractability of submodular games, we adopt a specific functional
form V (PA, PB) = (PA + PB) to capture the case of substitute capabilities. Note that the
3The results can be easily extended to n periods, and a sample path of market potential and effort
realizations can always be found that leads to contracts delayed by an arbitrary time.
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function is both submodular and supermodular and the results from previous subsection
still apply. However, for this special case, we may obtain sharper results as to when the
contract is signed.
Proposition 18 Let the coefficient of variation of the market potential be ψ = σ(ε1)m . Then,
there is a threshold ν such that the contract is signed before the project iff ψ ≤ ν
Thus, it can be seen that even for this specific case of submodular function, the results
retain their basic structure. Furthermore, the coefficient of variation plays an important role
in deciding when the contract is signed. The contract is always signed upfront before the
project has commenced when the uncertainty is low (i.e., low σ(ε1)) or when the expected
market potential is high (i.e., high m).
4.5 Conclusions
Motivated by a case study we conducted involving joint development of a new component
for aircrafts by two firms, Delta Airlines and 3M, we explore the negotiation and contract-
ing process in an NPD codevelopment setting. Based on our observations from the case
study, we have modelled and analyzed a generic setting of codevelopment. We employ
a process-based approach to modelling the codevelopment question and focus on the in-
formation acquisition and uncertainty resolution characteristic of processes. Our analysis
indicates that product development variables such as market and development uncertainty
have important implications to when and what contract should be negotiated and agreed
to.
Our results indicate that under conditions of high market or development uncertainty
firms may optimally delay signing a contract till at least a part of the uncertainty is resolved.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that delayed contracts mimic some of the behavior of real
options and that the value of delaying signing a contract may be traced to added flexibility
that firms retain without contract on their future actions. However, our analysis also
indicates the competitive setting of codevelopment also leads to lower effort levels due to
lack of committment from other party. Hence, it is the balance of the two forces - loss in
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value due to holdup resulting from lack of contract and value enhancement due to flexibility
arising from the absence of contract - that determines when a contract is signed.
Additional research is required to ascertain the impact of negotiation power and to
understand the effect of complimentary/substitute capabilities on the negotiation process
as well as the value of the joint development projects.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER II
Appendix A is organized as follows. First, examples 1 and 2, and figures 15 and 16 referenced
from the main text are given. Next, the summary and intuition behind the proofs of main
results together with the formal proofs for these results are provided. Finally, a proof of
observation 1 is provided.
Example 1
Table 4: Payoff matrix for the row player
ADOPT,ADOPT ADOPT,NOT-ADOPT NOT-ADOPT,ADOPT NOT-ADOPT,NOT-ADOPT
ADOPT 22+2+2 − 0.14 = 0.19 22+2+1 − 0.14 = 0.26 22+1+2 − 0.14 = 0.26 22+1+1 − 0.14 = 0.36







The following example illustrates the basic mechanism for technology adoption in a
single-period context. Consider 3 OEMs currently employing technology τ0 = 1 and let
total end-product market size = 1. Hence, each of them currently have payoff 11+1+1 =
1
3 .
Now suppose that the technology provider introduces a new technology τ = 2 and prices it
at 0.14. Let A represent the adopt strategy, and N the not-adopt strategy. Examination of
the payoff matrix in Table 4 reveals that, if the OEMs simultaneously decide on adoption,
then there would be three Nash equilibria {(A,A,N), (A,N,A), (N, A,A)}. Similarly if the
OEMs sequentially decide (i.e. OEM 1 decides before OEM 2 and OEM 2 decides before
OEM 3), then (A, A,N) is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Notice that in
our example, the OEMs end up worse off than if none of them had adopted1, but because
of the prisoners’ dilemma structure of the game, OEMs are compelled to adopt (similar to
the “confess” strategy in the prisoners’ dilemma game).
1The result is not an artifact of the constant-sum game we consider. It holds for a large class of models




Consider 3 OEMs, all of whom initially use technology 1. The technology provider
introduces technology T = 2, at the same time decides to develop technology αT = 2.1. Let
δ = 1 and m = 1. At the subgame perfect equilibrium the provider charges prices W1 = 0.28
and W2 = 0.14. These prices induce an equilibrium where 2 OEMs adopt technology T in
the first period, and in the second period the OEM who has not adopted T earlier adopts
technology αT .
In this same example if the technology provider decided to develop technology αT =
4, at subgame perfect equilibrium, the provider charges prices W1 = 0.13 and W2 = 0.13.
Further, these prices induce an equilibrium where all the OEMs adopt T and αT in periods
1 and 2 respectively.
Figures for Heterogeneous OEM markets
The left column of Figures 15 and 16 illustrate the case when the difference in capabilities
between H OEMs and L OEMs is small, and the right column for the case where the
difference in capabilities is relatively large.
H = Leap-frog, L = Only T
H = Leap-frog, L = Leap-frog
H = Saturation, L = Leap-frog
H = Saturation, L = Saturation
H = Saturation, L = Only T
 
(  )
H = Leap-frog, L = Only T
H = Leap-frog, L = Leap-frog
H = Saturation, L = Only T
 
(  )
H = Saturation, L = Cut-off
Figure 15: Two examples of Provider’s revenues corresponding to heterogeneity in Tech-
nology Enhancing Capabilities
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H = Only T, L = Leap-frog
H = Leap-frog, L = Leap-frog
 
(  )
H = Saturation, L = Saturation
H = Only T, L = Leap-frog
 
(  )
H = Leap-frog, L = Saturation
H = Only T, L = Saturation
Figure 16: Two examples of Provider’s revenues corresponding to heterogeneity in Tech-
nology Independent Capabilities
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For ease of exposition, we call the first-period adopters T-OEMs, and the first-period
non-adopters 1-OEMs (i.e. T-OEMs adopt and utilize technology T in the first period, and
1-OEMs do not adopt T and utilize technology 1 in the first period).
Proof of theorem 1
We prove the theorem using backward induction. The 5 stages are illustrated in Figure
1 of the main text. In the first period (2nd stage), the technology provider, given the second
period technology development decision αT , sets the price for technology T at W1. Then,
(at the 3rd stage) each OEM makes an adopt/not-adopt decision2 about technology T . In
the second period (4th stage), the provider prices the second-period technology (αT ) at W2.
Finally (at the 5th stage) each OEM decides whether to adopt/not-adopt αT .
The history (or the sequence of decisions in the past) for this 5-stage game is as follows.
The history at the third stage is the price {W1} set by the firm in the first period. The
history at the fourth stage is the tuple {W1, f} where f is the fraction that adopted in the
first period. The history at the fifth and final stage is the tuple {W1, f,W2}.
Notice that we have collapsed some of the history, in particular only the total number
of adopters and not the specific adopters are kept in history. Given that all the firms are
identical, the only information the technology provider needs so as to set the price is the
total number of adopters in the first period.
Summary of proof
Lemma 1 shows that irrespective of the prices charged for the second-period technology,
the second-period outcome is such that the T-OEMs adopt again in the second period
only if all the 1-OEMs adopt in the second period. Intuitively, the increase in revenues
an OEM accrues by adopting a new technology depends on the technology increment, and
hence switching from 1 to αT (for 1-OEMs) leads to larger increase in revenue compared
to upgrading from T to αT (for T-OEMs).
According to Lemma 2, at the final stage of the game, the number of adopters cannot
grow beyond the point where the revenue gain to an additional adopting OEM is equal to
2Note that this adopt/not-adopt decision depends not only on current (1st period) payoffs, but also on
(discounted) future 2nd period revenues.
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the price paid for the technology (i.e. marginal revenue for the marginal OEM <= price
paid for the technology).
Lemma 3 demonstrates an important result: in the second period, the technology
provider sells the technology αT either (a) to all the 1-OEMs, or (b) to all the OEMs
irrespective of their technology.
Lemma 5 gives the adoption behavior of the OEMs (i.e # of OEMs who adopt) in
the first period for an arbitrary price W1. Lemma 5 can also be equivalently viewed as
determining the price W1 that induces an arbitrary adoption pattern.
Finally, we demonstrate that if the technology provider induces partial adoption in the
first period, then it must necessarily be true that she sells only to the 1-OEMs in the second
period. The only alternative is that the the technology provider induces full adoption in
both the periods. These two strategies are termed the leap-frogging strategy and saturation
strategy respectively. Finally, we conclude the proof by noting that the maximum of the two
revenues, leap-frogging revenue and saturation revenue, determines the actual introduction
strategy followed by the profit maximizing technology provider.
An extended list of notations used in Appendix A is presented below. Also, as a note on
the presentation style, to maintain a linear presentation of the proofs, we present the proofs
of any auxillary lemmas required to prove the main results along with the main proofs.
f : fraction of adopters in 1st period
θf = nfT + n(1− f) : “Total” technology (performance) in period 1
γfT = (nf + n(1− f)α)T : “Total” technology (performance)in period 2 assuming no 1-OEM remains









: 1st period price to induce fraction f to adopt T






: 2nd period price to induce remaining (1− f)n OEMs to adopt αT
W a1 =
1
n − 1nT−T+1 : 1st period price that induces all the OEMs to adopt T





: 2nd period price that induces all the OEMs to adopt αT









− (T−1)θf (θf−T+1) − δm
(T−1)(γf−α)
(Tγf−Tα+1)(γf−α+1)
F = {f : Φ(f) ≥ 0, Ψ(f) ≥ 0} : Feasible values of f that the technology provider can induce
f∗(α) = arg maxf∈F
{
fW p1 (f, α)
+(1− f)W p2 (f, α)
}





+(1− f∗(α))W p2 (f∗(α), α)
]
: Provider’s revenues under leap-frogging
πa(α) = n(W a1 + W
a
2 (α)) : Technology provider’s revenue under saturation
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Formal proof of theorem 1
Lemma 1 Given any history {W1, f,W2} at the fifth stage, if p is the number of T-OEMs
who adopted again in the second period, and q is the number of 1-OEMs who adopted in the
second period, then {p > 0} =⇒ {q = (1− f)n}.
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose, corresponding to the price W2, the
equilibrium induced has p T-OEMs, and q 1-OEMs adopting the technology αT . Further,
let {p > 0} and {q 6= (1− f)n}. Define the following
βp,q = (fn− p) T + pαT + (1− f)n− q + qαT
Since, the induced adoption pattern is an equilibrium, none of the OEMs have any incentive
to deviate. In specific, if πTA is the payoff a T-OEM makes by deciding to adopt, and if π
T
N




−W2 ≥ m T
βp,q − αT + T
W2 ≤ m αT
βp,q
−m T
βp,q − αT + T
Similarly, for a 1-OEM who didnt adopt (note that there is always one such 1-OEM since
q 6= (1 − f)n), π1N > π1A where π1N and π1A are the payoffs of a 1-OEM before and after






βp,q − 1 + αT −W2
W2 > m
αT
βp,q − 1 + αT −m
1
βp,q
Hence, it is necessary that
m
αT







βp,q − αT + T
Simple algebra verifies that this inequality is never satisfied (the increase in revenues when
upgrading from technology 1 to αT is greater than the increase in revenues when upgrading
from technology T to αT ). This contradiction proves the claim (i.e. {p > 0} =⇒ {q =
(1− f)n}).
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Lemma 2 Given any history {W1, f, W2} at the fifth stage the number of adopters in the





− 1{ω≤1−f}1 + 1{ω>1−f}T
βω − αT + 1{ω≤1−f}1 + 1{ω>1−f}T
)
where βω = 1{ω≤1−f}(1− f − ω)n +
[
1{ω≤1−f}f + 1{ω>1−f}(1− ω)
]
nT + ωnαT
Proof. If nω OEMs adopt in the second period, then by Lemma 1, the OEM market has
the following structure with respect to the employed technology
nω : # of αT users
n
[
1{ω<1−f}f + 1{ω≥1−f}(1− ω)
]
: # of T users







βω − αT + 1{ω≤1−f}1 + 1{ω>1−f}T
G(ω) = G1(ω)−G2(ω)
where G1(ω) is the payoff of a second-period adopter, and G2(ω) is the payoff of a T-OEM
or 1-OEM (depending ω) who switches to a not-adopt decision in the second period. For nω
to be an equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that none of the OEMs have incentives
to deviate. Consider the following two cases.
Case 1: ω < 1− f
All the 1-OEMs who adopt in the second period would stick to their adoption decision
iff G1(ω)−W2 ≥ G2(ω), that is G(ω) ≥ W2. Furthermore, the 1-OEMs who decide not to
adopt in the second period stick to their decision iff G1(ω + 1n)−W2 < G1(ω + 1n), that is
G(ω + 1n) < W2 (since if a 1-OEM switches to adopt decision, the total fraction of adopters
increase by 1n).
Further, from lemma 1, if G(ω + 1n) < W2 for any ω < 1 − f (i.e. at least one of the
1-OEMs havent adopted), all the T-OEMs stick to their not-adopt decision.
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Hence, for ω < 1−f , nω is the number of adopters in second period iff G(ω) ≥ W2, and
G(ω + 1n) < W2.
Case 2: ω ≥ 1− f
The argument is similar to case 1. All the T-OEMs who adopt in the second period
stick to their adopt decision iff G(ω) ≥ W2, and all the T-OEM who decide not to adopt in
second period stick to their decision iff G(ω + 1n) < W2. Similarly, all the 1-OEMs adopt in
second period (by Lemma 1) and will stick to their decision (since W2 ≤ G(ω)).
Thus, for ω ≥ 1− f, nω is an equilibria iff G(ω) ≥ W2, and G(ω + 1n) < W2.
Combining the two cases, we get, for nω to be an equilibria, it is necessary and sufficient
that G(ω) ≥ W2 > G(ω + 1n).
Finally, to show that this equilibrium nω is unique, we prove that G(ω) decreases in ω.

































βω − αT + 1
)
= −m (βω − αT − 1) (αT − 1)
2
(βω − αT + 1) (βω + αT − 1)βω < 0
Similarly, algebra confirms that G(ω + 1n) < G(ω) for ω ≥ 1−f and G(ω = 1−f) < G(ω =
1− f − 1n) (upon request detailed calculations are available from the authors).
That is, G(ω) is a decreasing function of ω. Hence, we can state the condition G(ω) ≥
W2 > G(ω + 1n) as follows - the equilibrium ω is the largest ω value that satisfies the
inequality W2 ≤ G(ω).
In the subsequent lemmas we supress the subscripts of θf and γf , and instead use θ and γ,
whenever possible in order to simplify the notation.
Lemma 3 Given any first-period history {W1, f} the technology provider’s best response
function is given by









The corresponding number of second-period adopters are n and (1− f)n respectively.
Proof. Lemma 2 can also be looked on as determining the price W2 which induces nω
OEMs to adopt. That is, by setting W2 s.t. G(ω) ≥ W2 > G(ω+ 1n), the technology provier
induces nω OEMs to adopt (G(ω) is as defined in Lemma 2). Since the provider maximizes
profits, she charges G(ω), the highest possible value that still induces nω OEMs to adopt.
Her second-period revenues corresponding to nω OEMs adopting is
π2(ω) = nωG(ω)
ω chosen by the technology provider (indirectly by pricing at G(ω)) is such that her second-
period profits are maximized. We examine the structure of π2(ω) by considering two sepa-
rate cases.








































βω − αT + 1
)
= (αT − 1)m(βω − Tα) (ωn− Tωnα + βω) + (nω + 1)(αT − 1)
(βω − αT + 1) (βω − 1 + αT ) βω > 0
Case ii) ω > 1− f .
π2(ω) is increasing in ω (detailed algebra available from the authors).
That is π2(ω) is increasing in the interval [0, 1− f) and the interval (1− f, 1]. Hence, if
the fraction ω that the provider induces to adopt is not equal to 1 − f or 1, it cannot be
the provider’s best response strategy. The profits corresponding to ω = 1 − f and ω = 1
are respectively
π2(1− f) = n(1− f)G(1− f) = mn(1− f) (αT − 1) (γ − α)(γT − αT + 1) γ
and
π2(1) = nG(1) = m
(α− 1) (n− 1)
(nα− α + 1)
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Hence, the technology provider would chooses to price αT at G(1− f) if π2(1− f) > π2(1),
otherwise prices at G(1).
Lemma 4 At the third stage for a history {W1, f} if the provider optimally induces ω =
(1 − f) to adopt technology αT , then for any history (W ′1, q) such that q < f the provider
optimally induces ω = (1− q) to adopt αT .
Proof. Similar to Lemma 3 it can be shown that
(1−f)(αT−1)(γf−α)
(γf T−αT+1)γf
is a decreasing function
of f. That is(
(1−f)(αT−1)(γf−α)
(γf T−αT+1)γf





Intuitively, the technology provider’s strategy to sell to only the 1-OEMs in the second
period becomes more profitable when the number of 1-OEMs increases.
Lemma 5 Given a history {W1} the number of adopters in the first period is given by nf





∆ > − T (T−1)θf (θf+T−1) +
(T−1)
θf (θf−T+1) + δm
(T−1)(γf−α)
(Tγf−Tα+1)(γf−α+1)

























Proof. Suppose nf is the number of 1st period adopters (T-OEMs) at the equilibrium
corresponding to the price W1. Define





θ − T + 1
)













is the price required to induce fraction f to adopt in a single-
period version of our setting. Hence, ∆ as defined above is a premium representing the
difference between actual price and the equivalent single-period price.
We show that f is an equilibrium if and only if f must satisfies the constraints given by
R1 or R2. We proceed with the analysis of two cases.
Case (i) Suppose that last inequality of R1 is satisfied. That is,
(1− f)(αT − 1)(γ − α)
(γT − αT + 1)γ ≥
(α− 1)(n− 1)
(nα− α + 1)n
From Lemma 3 we know that if this inequality holds, the provider sets the second-period
price
W2 = m
(αT − 1)(γ − α)
(γT − αT + 1)γ
to induce all the (1− f)n 1-OEMs to adopt in the second period.








θ − T + 1 −∆ + δm
1
γ


















γT − αT + 1
Now consider the payoffs to a T-OEM who switches to a not-adopt decision in the first
period. From Lemma 4 if f decreases to f − 1n the provider still wishes to induce only
1-OEMs to adopt in the second period. After the T-OEM switching his decision in first
period the provider charges a new second-period price W ′2 that induces all the 1-OEMs to
adopt αT . By Lemma 3, W ′2 is
W ′2 = m
(
αT
γT − T + αT −
1
γT − T + 1
)















θ − T + 1 + δm
1
γT − T + 1
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θ + T − 1 −W1 + δm
T
γT − αT + T
=
T





θ − T + 1
)
−∆ + δm 1
γ − α + 1
The necessary and sufficient conditions for f to be an equilibrium are:
π′N < πN
and π′A < πA
which through algebra translate to the first two inequalities of (R1).
Case (ii) The last inequality in R2 is satisfied.
Lemma 3 dictates that if this condition holds the provider induces all the OEMs to
adopt in the second period. The corresponding second-period price is






















θ − T + 1 −∆ + δm
1






nα− α + 1
Along the same lines as Case (i), we calculate the deviation payoffs for a T-OEM as
π′A =
1
θ − T + 1 + δm
1
nα− α + 1
and for a 1-OEM as
π′N =
T
θ + T − 1 −W1 + δm
1
nα− α + 1
=
T





θ − T + 1
)
−∆ + δm 1
nα− α + 1
The necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium are
π′N < πN
and π′A ≤ πA
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which lead to the first two inequalities of R2.
We conclude from the two cases that for f to be an equilibrium, it is necessary and
sufficient that f must satisfy inequalities of either R1 or R2.
Observation: Lemma 5 determined the adoption pattern f for an arbitrary price W1.





, where ∆ satisfies the constraints of either R1 of R2, the technology provider
can induce the fraction f to adopt in the first period. Notice, that with this interpretation,
the supplier has no incentive to charge anything less than the highest possible ∆ to induce
a given f . That is, ∆ = δm (T−1)(γf−1)(Tγf−T+1)γf in the case of R1 and ∆ = 0 in the case of R2.
Next, we prove theorem 1.
Proof. Lemma 5 demonstrated that there are two possible equilibrium patterns correspond-
ing to an arbitrary price W1 - (i) A fraction f adopts in first period, and the remaining
(1−f)n 1-OEMs adopt in second period (corresponding to R1), and (ii) A fraction f adopts
in first period, and all the OEMs adopt in second period (corresponding to R2). We call
the first pattern the leap-frogging strategy and the second one the saturation strategy.
Leap-frogging:
Corresponding to a given fraction of adopters f in the first period, the technology







, that is Φ(f) ≥ 0, or f ∈ F1






) can be found which
achieves leap-frogging iff there is a ∆ that makes f feasible for R1. That is, it necessary
and sufficient that LOWER BOUND OF ∆ ≥ UPPER BOUND OF ∆. Algebra shows that
this condition is equivalent to Ψ(f) ≥ 0, or f ∈ F2. Also notice from the observation made
immediately after lemma 5 that ∆ = δm (T−1)(γf−1)(Tγf−T+1)γf in this case.
Hence a leap-frogging equilibrium with f adopters in first period is feasible iff f ∈
F1 ∩ F2 = F , and the corresponding first and second-period prices are





θf − T + 1
)
+ δm
(T − 1) (γf − 1)
(Tγf − T + 1) γf




γfT − αT + 1
88
and the corresponding revenue is given by πp = nfW
p
1 + n(1 − f)W p2 . Maximizing πp(f)
with respect to f gives us π∗p = maxf∈F πp(f), the optimal leap-frogging revenue.
Saturation:
In this case ∆ = 0, and the corresponding prices are









nα− α + 1
and the corresponding revenue is given by πa(f) = n[fW a1 (f) + W
a
2 ]. πa(f) is increasing in
f , thus if the technology provider follows saturation strategy, she sell to all the OEMs in
first period and the second period.










nα− α + 1
and the corresponding revenue is πa(1) = πa = nW a1 + nW
a
2
Hence the optimal strategy for the firm is evaluated by finding the maximum leap-
frogging revenue and comparing the revenue with the saturation strategy.
Proof of Proposition 1
Theorem 1 states that the optimal pricing strategy has one of the two structures: leap-
frogging, or saturation. The corresponding revenues are πp and πa. To show the existence
of the threshold αt, we need to show that πp(α) > πa(α) for all α < αt.
Suppose that α = 1. Then
πa(α = 1) = nW
πp(α = 1) = nf∗W
p
1 + n(1− f∗)W > nW since W p1 > W
Hence, πp(α = 1) > πa(α = 1)
Suppose α becomes very large. Then
πa(α →∞) = n( TnT − 1nT−T+1) + 1.m
πp(α →∞) < { nf
∗( Tnf∗T+n(1−f∗) − 1nf∗T−T+1+n(1−f∗)) + 1.m if f∗ < 1
n( TnT+n − 1nT−T+1) if f∗ = 1
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In either case (f∗ = 1 or f∗ < 1) πp(α →∞) < πa(α →∞). Therefore there exists at least
one crossing point for πp(α) and πa(α) which is the threshold αt.
Next, this crossing point (threshold) αt is shown to be unique by proving that the πa(α)−
πp(α) is non-decreasing. Lemma 6 gives sufficient conditions for the function πa(α)−πp(α)
to be non-decreasing, and then Lemma 7 proves the sufficient conditions in Lemma 6 are
indeed satisfied.
Lemma 6 Consider a function G (x, λ) . If G(x, λ) is increasing in x, then minp G(x, λ) is
increasing with x.
Proof. Consider x1 < x2, and let λ∗(x) = arg minλ G(x, λ). Then, minp G(x2, λ) =
G(x2, λ∗(x2)) ≥ G(x1, λ∗(x2)) ≥ minp G(x1, λ)
Lemma 7 {πa(α)− πp(α, f)} is non-decreasing in α





(πa(α)− πp(α, f)) = m n− 1

































− n(1− f)T − T














































(nα− α + 1)2 − n(1− f)
(
T 2f
(Tγf − αT + 1)2
+
(1− f)T




(nα− α + 1)2 − n(1− f)
(
T 2f
(Tγf − αT + 1)2
+
(1− f)T




(nα− α + 1)2 − n(1− f)T
(
fT − f + 1












 Obtained by maximizing with respect to f
≥ 0
Hence, ddα (πa(α)− πp(α, f)) ≥ 0, and the lemma is proved.
Proof of Corollary 1
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that πp(α = 1) > πa(α = 1), which completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the first-period price W p1 (f, α) under the leap-frogging strategy





θf − T + 1
)
+ δ.m.
(T − 1) (γf − 1)












nT − T + 1
= W a1
That is the first-period price under the leap-frogging strategy is always higher than the
first-period price under the saturation strategy. Further, Proposition 1 shows that the leap-
frogging strategy is optimal when α < αt. Combining the two results we get W ∗1 (α1) >
W ∗1 (α2) if α1 < αt, and α2 > αt.
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The second-period price W p2 (f, α) under the leap-frogging strategy












nα− α + 1
)
= W a2 (α)
Using this inequality (W p2 (f, α) > W2(α)) at α = αt− and noting that W a2 (α) is continous,
we get second-period price is decreasing and discontinous at the threshold (i.e. W ∗2 (αt−) >
W ∗2 (αt+)).
Proof of Proposition 3
We shall write the price or the profits as functions of δ and m only when required. To
prove the sensitivity results, we shall use Topkis’ theorem which characterizes the mono-
tonicity of maximizers (or minimizers) in terms of the supermodularity (or submodularity)
of functions (Theorem 6 in Topkis, 1978).
CLAIM 1: αt(δ,m) is a strictly increasing function of δ and of m
Proof. Since αt(δ,m) is the crossing point of πp(δ,m) and πa(δ,m), the propositions are
proven if we show that πp(δ,m) − πa(δ,m) is a strictly increasing function of δ and of m
(for a rigourous proof of this statement see Lemma 8 below). We have
πp(δ,m)− πa(δ,m) = nmax
f
[fW p1 (f, δ,m) + (1− f)W p2 (f, m)]− n(W a1 + W a2 (m))
However, notice that n maxf [fW
p
1 (f, δ,m)+(1−f)W p2 (f,m)]−n(W a1 +W a2 (m)) is a strictly








(Tγf−T+1)γf is a strictly
increasing function of δ. Hence, πp(δ,m, α)− πa(δ,m, α) is a strictly increasing function of
δ. Therefore αt(δ,m) (solution to πp(δ,m) = πa(δ,m)) is a strictly increasing function of δ.
For the second part of the claim define Γ(m) = fW p1 (f, δ,m)+(1−f)W p2 (f, m)−W a2 (m)).
Then,
πp(δ,m)− πa(δ,m) = nmax
f
[fW p1 (f, δ,m) + (1− f)W p2 (f, m)]− n(W a1 + W a2 (m))
= nmax
f
[Γ(m)]− n(W a1 )
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Hence, if Γ(m) is strictly increasing in m, then πp(δ,m) − πa(δ,m) must also be strictly
increasing in m.

















































holds for the equilib-
rium to be subgame perfect (this is actually one of the constraints of R2). Hence Γ(m) is
increasing in m, which implies that πp(δ,m)−πa(δ,m) is strictly increasing in m. Therefore
is αt(δ,m) is strictly increasing in m.
Lemma 8 Consider a function G(x, θ). Define a threshold t(θ) as : t(θ) = max{x :
G(x, θ) ≥ 0}. If G(x, θ) is increasing in θ, then the threshold t(θ) is increasing in θ.
Proof. Let θ1 < θ2. G(t(θ1), θ1) ≥ 0 (by definition of t(θ)). Hence, G(t(θ1), θ2) > 0 (since
G(x, θ) is increasing in θ and θ2 > θ1). This implies that t(θ2) > t(θ1) (by definition of t(θ)
as the highest x which satisfies G(x, θ) ≥ 0.) That is, θ1 < θ2 ⇒ t(θ1) < t(θ2).
CLAIM 2: f∗(δ,m) is non-decreasing in δ and is non-increasing in m.
Proof. Since f∗(δ,m) = arg maxf∈F {fW p1 (f, δ,m) + (1− f)W p2 (f, m)}, to prove the claim
it suffices to show that fW p1 (f, δ,m) + (1 − f)W p2 (f, m)} is supermodular in (f, δ) and
submodular in (f, m) (Topkis’ theorem).
From the definitions of W p1 (f, δ,m) and W
p
2 (f,m) we observe that this is equivalent to
showing the supermodularity of δ.m.f. (T−1)(γf−1)(Tγf−T+1)γf with respect to (f, δ), and the submod-
ularity of δ.m.f. (T−1)(γf−1)(Tγf−T+1)γf + (1− f)m.(
α
γf
− 1γf T−αT+1) with respect to (f, m).
Which in turn is equivalent to showing that f. (T−1)(γf−1)(Tγf−T+1)γf is an increasing function of
f , and δ.f. (T−1)(γf−1)(Tγf−T+1)γf + (1 − f)(
α
γf
− 1γf T−αT+1) is a decreasing function of f . Lemma 9
proves this.
Hence f∗(δ,m) is non-decreasing in δ and non-increasing in m.
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γf T−αT+1) is a decreasing function of f .










γ − (α− 1) −
1



















(T (γ − (α− 1))− T + 1) −
1







γ − (α− 1) −
1




















function of f (Intuitively, it is the revenue made by the supplier by selling to (1 − f)n
customers in the second period, and this increases with (1 − f) or equivalently decreases
with f). Hence, Θ2(f) + δ ∗Θ1(f) is decreasing in f for sufficiently low δ. For the case of
large δ (i.e., δ close to 1), it can be shown by brute-force differentiation of Θ2(f)+ δ ∗Θ1(f)
with respect to f that Θ2(f)+δ∗Θ1(f) is decreasing in f (upon request detailed calculations
are available from the authors).
CLAIM 3: W1(δ,m) is strictly increasing in m, and W2(δ,m) is strictly increasing in δ
except perhaps at a finite number of points.
CLAIM 4: W2(δ,m) is strictly increasing in δ and W1(δ,m) is strictly increasing in m,
except perhaps at a finite number of points.
Proof. To obtain the proof of these claims it is sufficient to observe that when m increases,
W p1 (δ,m) increases because of (a) a decrease in f
∗(δ,m) and (b) an increase in second term
(∆ term representing the premium) of W p1 (δ,m).
Similarly when δ increases, W p2 (δ,m) increases because of a decrease in 1− f∗(δ,m).
CLAIM 5: πs(δ,m) is strictly increasing in m and is strictly increasing in δ.
Proof. Consider m1 < m2, and let the corresponing optimal fractions be f∗1 and f
∗
2 ,
revenues be π1p(f = f
∗




2 ), first-period prices be W
1
1 (f = f
∗
1 ) and W
2




second-period prices be W 12 (f = f
∗
1 ) and W
2





2 ) ≥ π2p(f = f∗1 ) since f∗2 is the optimal fraction for market-size = m2






2 (f = f
∗
1 )(1− f∗1 ))






2 (f = f
∗
1 )(1− f∗1 )) since W1 and W2 increases in m
= π1p(f = f
∗
1 )
Hence, the technology provider’s revenue must be strictly increasing in m.
Similarly consider δ1 < δ2, and let the optimal fractions be f1 = f∗1 and f2 = f
∗
2
respectively. It can be seen that in the high discount rate case (i.e. δ2), if the provider
sells to the same fraction of OEMs as in the low discount factor case (i.e. f2 = f∗1 ), she
can charge a higher price in the first period and same price as before in the second period.
Hence, the revenue must again be strictly higher for the higher discount case.
CLAIM 6: πc(δ,m) is decreasing in δ
Proof. Since the sum of payoffs of the supplier and all the OEMs is constant (= 1 + m),
and since by claim 5 we have that the supplier revenues increase with δ, we conclude that
the OEM revenues must decrease with δ.
Proof of Proposition 4
Theorem 1 determines the provider’s profits under the leap-frogging strategy as the
maximum over f of a linear function of δ (i.e. πs = maxf{Linear function of δ}. Since
f is a bounded discrete variable, this implies that the profits are convex in δ (since πs is
the maximum of a set of linear functions of δ and must necessarily be convex in δ). Also
from claim 5 we know that the revenues are increasing in δ. By our definition of δ as the
expected value of the discount factor (i.e δ = E[δ(t)] = (1− p)δ(ta) + pδ(ta + d)), δ is linear
and decreasing in p (the probability of delays). Hence, πs is decreasing and convex in p.
Proof of Proposition 5
Counter-example to prove proposition 5 given in Figure 17
Proof of Proposition 6
From program 1 (given in the main text), we know that α∗ = arg maxα≥1{max(πp(α), πa(α))−














Figure 17: Supplier revenues as a function of α for the parameters T = 2,n = 100,δ =
0.9,m = 1
Using Topkis’ theorem, it follows that α∗(c) is decreasing in c in the region where provider
undertakes leap-frogging strategy.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 6 establishes that the optimal α∗ is decreasing in c. Further, from Proposi-
tion 1 we know that if α∗ ≤ αt, the technology provider would pursue leap-frogging strategy.
Combining these results, we obtain that if the cost of development c is above a threshold ct
(corresponding to optimal development effort αt), the technology provider would undertake
a development effort α (< αt), and hence would choose leap-frogging strategy.
Proof of proposition 8
From program 1 (given in the main text), we know that α∗ = arg maxα≥1{πp(α, δ)−c(α−
1)2} if the supplier follows leap-frogging strategy. Hence to prove that α∗ is decreasing in δ
it is sufficient to show that πp(α, δ) is submodular in (α, δ) (Topkis’ theorem). Since πp(α) =
n[f∗W p1 (f
∗, α, δ,m)+ (1− f∗)W p2 (f∗, α, m)], this implies we need to show that W p1 (., α, δ, .)














ular in (α, δ), which is true since
(T−1)(γf−1)
(Tγf−T+1)γf
is decreasing in α (Lemma 10).
Similarly, to show the monotonic increase of α∗ with m we need to show that πp(α, m)
is supermodular in (α,m) (Topkis’ theorem). Therefore we need to show that πp(α, m) =



























is increasing in α (Lemma 11).
Lemma 10
(T−1)(γf−1)
(Tγf−T+1)γf is decreasing in α.






= (T−1)(γ−1)(Tγ−T+1)γ is decreasing in γ. Taking the derivative with respect











T (γ − 1)2 − 1
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is increasing in α.














































(γT − αT + 1)2
)
≥ 0
As the first extension, we consider the case of upgrade prices. For technology mar-
kets which have upgrade prices, we show that the equilibrium solutions retain their basic
structure (as well as many of the secondary results as the basic model).
This game differs from the no-upgrade price game only in the 4th stage. At the beginning
of the second period (4th stage), the technology provider prices the second-period technology
αT at W2 if the adopting OEM is a 1-OEM, and at W2−u if the adopting OEM is a T-OEM.
A summary of the proof is given next before proceeding with the formal proof.
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Summary of Proof of theorem 1′
The structure of the proof follows that of Theorem 1. To highlight the similarities, the
auxillary lemmas are numbered similarly. For instance Lemma 2′ for Theorem 1′ is similar
to Lemma 2 for Theorem 1.
Lemma 2′ outlines the necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary number of αT
adopters to be an equilibrium. Intuitively, the number of adopters (both from the T-OEMs
and from the 1-OEMs) is such that the increase in revenues for the marginal adopter (“last”
adopter) is balanced out by the price paid for the technology.
Lemma 3′ demonstrates that, in the second period, the technology provider sells tech-
nology αT to all the T-OEMs (at an upgrade discount), and to all the 1-OEMs.
Then, Lemma 5′ gives the adoption behavior of the OEMs in the first period for any
arbitrary first-period price W1. Lemma 5′ can also be interpreted as determining the price
W1 which induces an arbitrary adoption pattern.
Next, we formulate a mathematical program to determine the number of first-period
adopters the technology provider would induce. Finally, Proposition 19 demonstrates that
the optimal fraction of adopters is increasing with technology enhancement. Hence, the
technology provider would induce partial adoption in the first period if and only if the
technology enhancement is below a threshold.
Formal Proof of theorem 1′
Lemma 2′ Given any history {W1, f, W2, u} at the fifth stage, let np is the number of
T-OEMs who adopted again in second period, an nq is the number of 1-OEMs who adopted
in second period. Then, (p,q) is an equilibrium iff
(
αT



























βp,q = (f − p)Tn + npαT + ((1− f)− q) n + nqαT
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Proof. If (p, q) is an equilibrium, then none of the 1-OEMs must have an incentive to




−W2 ≥ m 1
βp,q − αT + 1
and m
αT















βp,q − αT + 1
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m




−W2 + u ≥ m T
βp,q − αT + T
and m
αT















βp,q − αT + T
)
m
Lemma 3′ Given any history {W1, f}, it is optimal for the technology provider to set a











nα− α + 1 −
1
nαT − αT + 1
)
such that at the corresponding equilibrium all the T-OEMs and all the 1-OEMs adopt tech-
nology αT .
Proof. Let π(p, q) be the revenues accrued by the technology provider by setting the price
(W2, u) such that the equilibrium induced is (p, q). Then,
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β2 − Tnαβ − Tαβ − T 2nα + T 2nα2) (α− 1) T
(β + T − Tα) β2
≥ 0
Similarly, it can be shown that ∂π∂q ≥ 0. Hence, π(p, q) < π(p+1, q) and π(p, q) < π(p, q+1),
and the technology provider can always gain higher revenues by increasing p or q. That is
the maximum for π(p, q) would be attained at the boundery, i.e. at p = f , and q = 1− f .
Substituting these maximizing values into the expression for W2 and u, the lemma is proved.
Lemma 5′ Corresponding to a first-period price W1, f is an equilibrium iff
T
θf + T − 1 −
1
θf
< W1 − δm
(
T
nαT − αT + T −
1





θf − T + 1
Proof. Consider the payoff πA of a first-period adopter, and let π′A be his payoff if he











θf − T + 1 + δm
(
1
nαT − αT + 1
)
Similarly, let πN be the payoff of a first-period non-adopter, and let π′N be his payoff if he











θf + T − 1 −W1 + δm
(
T
nαT − αT + T
)
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nαT − αT + T −
1
nαT − αT + 1
)
Next, we formulate a mathematical program to determine the optimal fraction of adopters
in the first period induced by the technology provider.
f∗ (α) = arg max
f
{πp(f)} = arg max
f







θf − T + 1 + δm
(
T
nαT − αT + T −
1

























θf − T + 1 −m (1− δ)
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Proposition 19 f∗ (α) is a non-decreasing function of α.
























is supermodular in (f, α) (Top-
























is increasing function of α. For the second part, it is again
supermodular since it is independent of α. Hence, it is proved that f∗ is non-decreasing in
α.
A number of secondary results relating to the dependence of optimal introduction strat-
egy on m, δ, and α can be obtained. We summarize them in the following table. These
results, are identical to the ones in Proposition 3 suggesting that the basic insights devel-
oped in the no-upgrade case are robust and applicable to this new setting. Proofs of these
results are available upon request.
δ or −p m α
CLAIM 2′ f∗ ↗ ↘ ↗
CLAIM 3′ W1 ↗ ↗ ↘
CLAIM 4′ W2 constant ↗ ↗
CLAIM 4′′ u constant ↗ ↘
CLAIM 5′ πs ↗ ↗ -
CLAIM 6′ πc ↘ - -
Proof of Observation 1
Technology Enhancing Capabilities : Consider an OEM with capability κ who employs
technology τ . His revenues are given by κτD where D is the denominator term representing
the total quality in the market. Switching to technology T (T > τ) implies
Marginal Benefit ∆(κ) =
κT






(D2 − 2Dκτ + κ2τ2 − κ2Tτ)(T − τ)
D(D + κT − κτ)2 > 0
Hence, for technology enhancing capabilities, H OEMs (who have capability κ = κh) have
higher marginal benefit than L OEMs (who have capability κ = 1).
Technology Independent Capabilities: Consider an OEM with capability κ who employs
technology τ . His revenues are given by κ+τD where D is the denominator term representing
102
the total quality in the market. Switching to technology T (T > τ) implies
Marginal Benefit ∆(κ) =
κ + T





= − T − τ
D(D − τ + T ) < 0
Hence, for technology enhancing capabilities, H OEMs (who have capability κ = κh) have
lower marginal benefit than L OEMs (who have capability κ = 0).
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER III
The payoffs to the (row player) OEMs after successful integration is as given in Table 5.
For instance, the cell {SUCCESS, FAIL} denotes the payoffs (=b) to the row-player when
outcome of his integration is success, and the outcome of his competitor’s integration process
is failure.
For ease of notation, let pC = pC(T ) and pI = pI(f). Table 6 gives the joint dis-
tribution of the outcome of the integration effort. For instance, the probability of the
row-player succeeding while his competitor fails his integration is given by the value in cell
{SUCCESS, FAIL} = pCpI(1− pI).
Based on Tables 5 and 6, we may evaluate the expected payoffs to OEMs conditional
on their adoption decisions (i.e, decisions whether or not to license the component). Table
7 gives this expected payoffs (to the row player). For instance, the value in the cell {A,N}
denotes the expected payoffs to the row-player when he decides to adopt the component
whereas his competitor decides not to adopt it.









FAIL pC(1− pI)pI pC(1− pI)2 + (1− pC)
Proof of Proposition 9
Table 8 gives the net (expected) payoffs (i.e., payoffs - license-fee). The proof is easily
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+ (1− pC)d d
deduced from direct examination of the table.
Proof of Corollary 2
The provider’s revenues under saturation strategy is
πs = 2(Ws − C)
= pC(pIF − p2I(F − S)) where F = b− d and S = a− c






(F − 2pI(f)(F − S))
< 0 iff pI(f) >
F
2(F − S)





Before proving Theorem 2, we state and prove the following auxilliary lemma.
Lemma 12 For an arbitrary function F (x), let N (F ) be the number of roots of the equa-
tion F (x) = 0. If F (x) is twice differentiable and convex and N (F ) < ∞, then, N (F ) ≤ 2.
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Proof. Suppose the equation has more than 2 roots. Let x1, x2, x3 be 3 of the roots such
that x1 < x2 < x3 and there are no roots between x1 and x2 and between x2 and x3. By
mean value theorem, we know that there exists an x12 ∈ (x1, x2) such that F (x2)−F (x1)x2−x1 =
F ′ (x12). However, F (x2) = F (x1) = 0. Hence, there exists an x12 ∈ (x1, x2) such that
F ′ (x12) = 0. Similarly, there exists an x23 ∈ (x2, x3) such that F ′ (x23) = 0.
F (x) is convex, hence F ′′ (x) ≥ 0. Thus, F ′ (x) is non-decreasing. That is, for any
x < y, F ′ (x) ≤ F ′ (y). We know that there exists x12 ∈ (x1, x2) and x23 ∈ (x2, x3) such
that F ′ (x12) = F ′ (x23) = 0. Hence, for all x ∈ [x12, x23] F ′ (x) = 0. That is, F (x) is
constant in the interval [x12, x23]. Since x2 ∈ (x12, x23) and F (x2) = 0, this means that for
all x ∈ [x12, x23], F (x) = 0. However, this is a contradiction since we assumed that there
are no roots between x1, x2, x3.
Proof of Theorem 2
The profits under the saturation and niche strategy are given by πs and πn respectively
where





pI (b− d)− p2I ((b− d)− (a− c))
)− C)
For ease of notation, let
F = b− d
S = a− c






pIF − p2I (F − S)
)− C) > pCpIF − C
i.e. 2pCp2I (F − S)− pCpIF + C < 0
Define the function
G (pI) = pC
(
2p2I (F − S)− pIF
)
+ C
Thus, the saturation strategy is superior to niche strategy iff G (pI) ≤ 0.
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(
2p2I (F − S)− pIF
)
is convex in pI . Suppose, C(p−1I (x)) is convex in x. (This assump-
tion allows ease of exposition. See the note at the end of the proof how this assumption
can be eliminated relatively easily.) Hence, G(pI) is convex. Thus, by Lemma 12 it has at
most two roots. These roots give the two critical thresholds critical values of pI at which
the strategy switches between saturation and niche. Also note that for very low values of
pI , (for instance pI ≈ 0), G(pI) > 0 and it is optimal to use the niche strategy. Thus, there
exists p1 and p2 (defined by the roots of G (pI) = 0) such that for saturation strategy is
superior to niche strategy only if p1 ≤ pI ≤ p2.
It is optimal to use the niche strategy instead of not-selling iff pCpIF − C > 0. Thus,
there exists a threshold p0 (since pCpI (b− d)−C is increasing in pI) such that niche adoption
is superior to not-selling iff pI ≥ p0. At this threshold G (pI = p0) = pC
(
2p20 (F − S)− p0F
)
+
C = 2pCp20 (F − S) > 0. Hence, at pI = p0 niche is superior to saturation, thus giving us
that p0 ≤ p1. It can be verified that saturation strategy (for p1 ≤ pI ≤ p2) is always superior
to no-sale since (i) saturation is superior to niche in this region, and (ii) niche is superior
to no-sale in this region (since pI ≥ p1 ≥ p0).
Thus the existence of the three threshold p0, p1, p2 are established for the probabilities
of integration success pI . The equivalent thresholds on f are given by f0 = p−1I (p0) , f1 =
p−1I (p1) , f2 = p
−1
I (p2).
The proof for thresholds for the technologies is very similar, and a brief sketch is provided
below. Let
G(T ) = pC
(
2p2I (F − S)− pIF
)
+ C
= pIpC (2pI (F − S)− F ) + C
By assumption A1, b(T ) is concave in T , hence F (T ) = b(T )− d is concave in T , hence
−F is convex in T . Furthermore, by assumption A4, F − S is convex in T . Similarly by
assumption C is convex in T . Hence, G (T ) is convex in T and has at most two roots.
As before, there exists also a region such that no sale occurs. Thus the existence of three
thresholds for the technology T is also proved.
Note: We assumed that C(p−1I (x)) is convex in x. Now suppose C(p
−1
I (x)) is concave in x,
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then pI(C−1(x)) is convex in x, and thresholds for C (say C0, C1, C2) can be found that are
equivalent to the thresholds p0, p1, p2 we used in the proof provided earlier.
Proof of Proposition 10
Case 1: f0(T ) is non-increasing in T .
To prove this, consider T2 > T1 and assume the converse, i.e., let f0 (T2) > f0 (T1).
Choose any f ∈ (f0 (T1) , f0 (T2)). Since f > f0 (T1), the point [f, T1] cannot be in the no-
sale region. Since f < f0 (T2), the point [f, T2] must be in the no sale region. Thus, there
exists an f such that as T increases (i.e., we go from T1 to T2 where T2 > T1), we switch
into no-sale region from saturation or niche region. This is obviously false by Theorem 2.
Hence, f0 (T2) ≤ f0 (T1) for all T2 > T1, that is f0 (T ) is non-increasing
The proofs for the sensitivity of all other thresholds are similar and not shown.
Proof of Proposition 11.(A)







+pI (1− pI) (b−Dbw)
+ (1− pI) pIc
+(1− pI)2 d

 + (1− pC)d− C(f)−W pC
(
pI(b−Dbw)
+ (1− pI) d
)






+ (1− pC)d d
Table 9 gives the net (expected) payoffs (i.e., payoffs - (demand × per-unit-fee + license-





+pI (1− pI) (b−Dbw)














p2IDaw + pI (1− pI) Dbw
)
+ W ≤ pC
(
pIF (w)− p2I (F (w)− S (w))
)− C
Similarly, the necessary and sufficient condition for {A,N} (or {N, A}) to be an equilibrium
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can be easily written down from looking at Table 9. These conditions are
pCpIDbw + W ≤ pCpIF (w)− C
Proof of Proposition 11.(B)
Case 1: Suppose the provider uses the saturation strategy with license fees [W,w]. Then,
her expected revenue is
πs = 2W + pC(p2I(2wDa) + pI(1− pI)(wDb) + (1− pI)pI(wDb))
= 2
(
W + pC(p2IDaw + pI(1− pI)Dbw)
)
From Proposition 11.(B) we know that under saturation strategy
(
W + pC(p2IDaw + pI(1− pI)Dbw)
)
< pC(pIF (w)− p2I(F (w)− S(w)))− C.
Thus, the maximum revenues the provider can obtain is given by
πs = 2 max
w
{pC(pIF (w)− p2I(F (w)− S(w)))− C}
Notice that the maximizing value of w (= w∗) gives the optimal per-unit license-fee for the
saturation strategy, and the optimal value of fixed-fee is given by W such that
(
W + pC(p2IDaw
∗ + pI(1− pI)Dbw∗)
)
= pC(pIF (w∗)− p2I(F (w∗)− S(w∗)))− C.
Case 2: Now suppose the provider uses niche strategy with license fees [W,w]. Then, her
expected revenue is
πn = W + pCpIDbw
≤ pCpIF (w)− C from Proposition 11.(A)
Thus, the maximum revenues the provider obtains under the niche strategy is given by
maxw pCpIF (w)−C. Since F (w) = b(w)− d is decreasing in w (by assumption A5.1), the
maximizing value is w = 0. Thus, the provider does not use per-unit license-fees under the
niche strategy and her optimal profits are given by
πn = pCpIF (w = 0)− C
Proof of Corollary 3
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The proof follows directly from Proposition 11.(B) by observing that the per-unit volume-
based royalty is present only under the saturation strategy and never under the niche strat-
egy.
Proof of Theorem 3
The thresholds on f are proved first. From Proposition 11.(B) we know that the revenues
under saturation strategy
πs = 2pC max
w
{pIF (w)− p2I(F (w)− S(w))} − C
and the revenues under niche strategy is
πn = pCpIF (w = 0)− C
Consider the function
G(pI , w) = pCpIF (w = 0)− C −
(
2pC(pIF (w)− p2I(F (w)− S(w)))− C
)
= pCpIF (w = 0) + C − 2pC(pIF (w)− p2I(F (w)− S(w)))
As in Theorem 2, it can readily be shown that G(pI , w) is convex in pI and thus has only two
roots. Let the corresponding values of f be f1(w) and f2(w). That is, G(pI(f1(w)), w) = 0
and G(pI(f2(w)), w) = 0. Furthermore, for any f at which saturation strategy is optimal,
there must exist a w such that f1(w) ≤ f ≤ f2(w),
Consider two arbitrary values for f , say f ′ and f ′′ at which the saturation strategy is
superior to niche strategy. Then, exists w′ and w′′ such that
f1(w′) ≤ f ′ ≤ f2(w′)
f1(w′′) ≤ f ′′ ≤ f2(w′′)
Without loss of generality, suppose f ′ < f ′′. To prove that the saturation region is optimal
for any f ∈ (f ′, f ′′), it suffices to prove that there exists ŵ such that
f1(ŵ) ≤ f ≤ f2(ŵ)
Also, note that f2(w) is continous1.
1The continuity of f1(·) and f2(·) may be verified by observing that F (·) and S(·) are continous and
differentiable.
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Case 1: f2(w′) ≥ f
Then, w′ satisfies the requirement since f1(w′) ≤ f ′ ≤ f ≤ f2(w′)
Case 2: f2(w′) < f
Since f ′ ≤ f2(w′) < f < f ′′ ≤ f2(w′′), and since f2(·) is continous, there exists a ŵ ∈ [w′, w′′]
such that f2(ŵ) = f . Furthermore, f1(ŵ) ≤ f2(ŵ). Hence, this ŵ satisfies the requirement
as f1(ŵ) ≤ f = f2(ŵ). Thus, it is proved that for any f ∈ [f ′, f ′′] we again follow the
saturation strategy. This implies that the new thresholds where we follow the saturation
strategy is given by f1 = minw f1(w) and f2 = maxw f2(w). The threshold f0 is evaluated
as in Theorem 2 since under the niche strategy volume-based royalty are suboptimal and
the results remain identical.
The proof for the threshold on T is identical and is available from the authors.
Proof of Proposition 12
The proof mirrors the proof of Proposition 10 and is available from the authors.
Proof of Proposition 13
From Proposition 11.(B), we know that the optimal volume-based royalty under satu-
ration strategy is given by
w∗ = arg max
w
{F (w)− pI(F (w)− S(w))}
Consider an arbitrary f ′ for which it is optimal not to charge any volume-based royalties
(i.e., w = 0). Then,
F (w)− pI(f ′)(F (w)− S(w)) ≤ F (0)− pI(f ′)(F (0)− S(0))
Furthermore, it can be easily verified that when pI(f = 0) = 0 it is optimal not to charge
any volume-based royalties (since F (w) = b(w)− d is decreasing in w). That is,
F (w)− 0(F (w)− S(w)) ≤ F (0)− 0(F (0)− S(0))























{F (0)− 0(F (0)− S(0))}


i.e., F (w)−pI(f)(F (w)−S(w)) ≤ F (0)−pI(f)(F (0)−S(0)). Hence, no volume-based
royalties will be charged for any f < f ′ either. Thus, there exists a threshold fv such that
volume-based royalties are optimal iff f ≥ fv.
Proof of Proposition 14
K is the complexity of the interfaces, and pI = pI(f,K) where pI(f,K) is decreasing
in K, increasing in f , and submodular in (f, K). As in the proof of Theorem 2, we may
find the thresholds p0, p1, p2. Notice that these thresholds do not involve K. However,
the equivalent thresholds f0, f1, f2 depend on K. Since pI(f,K) is decreasing in K, the
equivalent thresholds are all increasing in K. Thus, the region [0, f0] (which is the no-sale
region) increases in K.
To prove that the saturation region becomes larger with K, we need to show that f2−f1
is increasing in K. Define the (inverse) function f(p,K) such that p = pI(f(p, K),K) (i.e.,
f(p, K) is the inverse function defined for a specific value of p and K). To prove our claim
about saturation region increasing, it is sufficient to to show that f(p2,K) − f(p1,K) is


























≥ 0 since pI(f,K) is submodular, i.e., ∂
2p
∂f∂K ≤ 0
Thus, f2 − f1 is increasing in K and the saturation-region becomes larger with K.
Finally, since both saturation and no-sale region become larger with K, it must neces-
sarily be true that niche-region becomes smaller with K.
112
APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER IV
Proof of Theorem 4
If no contract is signed till the end of 2nd period, then the joint value that can be
obtained through a contract is MV (PA1 + ηA1 +PA2 + ηA2, PB1 + ηB1 +PB2 + ηB2). Hence,
whoever proposes the contract will take the entire pie leaving the other party no alternative
than to accept the contract. Since the probability of being the proposer is 12 , the expected
profits is given by
1
2
MV (PA1 + ηA1 + PA2 + ηA2, PB1 + ηB1 + PB2 + ηB2)
Thus looking ahead from the beginning of period 2, the firms see that if a contract is not
signed then, the profits would be given by the nash-equilibrium of the game where the
payoffs are given by




(m + ε1 + ε2)V (PA1 + ηA1 + x + ηA2, PB1 + ηB1 + y + ηB2)
]
− c(x)
Let these equilibrium values be u(x∗, y∗).
However, if a contract is signed at the beginning of period 2, the total value that can
be generated is given by
Π = max
x,y
{E [(m + ε1 + ε2)V (PA1 + ηA1 + x + ηA2, PB1 + ηB1 + y + ηB2)]− c(x)− c(y)}
It can be seen that an acceptable contract exists iff Π ≥ 2u(x∗, y∗) since without this the
minimum feasible allocation without contract may be obtained by not signing right away.
Some algebra verifies that this condition is always satisfied, hence the contract is always
signed at the end of period 1 if not signed sooner and the theorem is proved.
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Proof of Theorem 5







E [(m + ε1 + ε2)V (x1 + ηA1 + x2 + ηA2, y1 + ηB1 + y2 + ηB2)]




It can be seen that Π is independent of the variance of ε1 and ε2 (since Π is linear in the
random variables).
The existence of thresholds can be established if we can show that the value of delaying
the contract till end of 1st period is increasing in the variance of ε1. By Theorem 4, the
value of delaying the contract till end of period 1 is given by the nash equilibrium of the
game with payoffs

















It can be shown relatively easily that this game is supermodular in (x, y) and is also
supermodular in the parameter (i.e., u(x, y; σ) is supermodular in (x, σ) and (y, σ). Thus,
the value is increasing in σ (as an aside, it also emerges that the initial effort levels x∗ = PA1
and y∗ = PB1 are increasing in σ). Thus the existence of thresholds on σ are established.
Proof of Propositions 16 and 17
The value of the project is the greater of the following two values: value when the
contract is delayed till end of period 1, or value when the contract is signed upfront. From
the proof of Theorem 5 we know that the value of the project when the contract is delayed
till end of period 1 is increasing in the uncertainty σ. Furthermore, we have also shown
that the value of project when contract is signed upfront is independent of the uncertainty
(i.e., is constant). Thus, the maximum of these two values must be non-decreasing in the
uncertainty (σ) and the proposition is proved.
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Proof of proposition 18






E[(m + ε1 + ε2)(x + η1A + a + η2A + y + η1B + b + η2B)]







The value of contract when signed at end of first period is










= (m + σε)
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Thus, expected value when putting in efforts x and y is







































Thus, the proposition is proved.
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